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ABSTRACT 
The United States Supreme Court’s evolving standards of decency jurisprudence has come to be understood as having 
forged an irreversible one-way ratchet moving only toward greater leniency.  The seemingly irreversible ratchet emerges 
both from practical challenges for state legislatures in pursuing stricter sanctions under the evolving standards of 
decency framework of analysis and an underlying assumption that moral evolution in criminal justice only moves 
towards lesser not greater sanctions.  This Article offers a challenge to the latter assumption, the view that moral 
evolution can only be towards lesser not greater sanctions being imposed.  This Article also attempts to provide a 
solution to the practical problem of the Eight Amendment ratchet puzzle, rendering reversible the seemingly irreversible 
ratchet.  In doing so, the Article sets forth two critical mechanisms—contingent legislation and the active use of 
resolutions—which if utilized by state legislatures will enable them to more effectively engage in a constitutional 
dialogue with the United States Supreme Court in defining societal evolving standards of decency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In theory, “[t]he Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet, whereby a tempo-
rary consensus on leniency for a particular crime fixes a permanent constitu-
tional maximum, disabling the States from giving effect to altered beliefs and 
responding to changed social conditions.”1  In practice, however, it appears 
that “[s]ociety’s moral evolution is constitutionally treated as a one-way 
ratchet . . . away from the use of capital punishment.”2  Nor is the narrowing 
of the discretion afforded to legislatures with regard to criminal sanctions 
limited to constricting the application of the death penalty.  To the contrary, 
the Supreme Court’s one-way ratchet reaches as far as its jurisprudence does 
in finding a sanction to be inconsistent with society’s evolving standards of 
decency.  Thus, the reach of the one-way ratchet extends beyond circum-
scribing application of the death penalty to curtailing, for example, the ability 
of states to impose life-sentences for juvenile offenders for non-homicide of-
fenses,3 to impose non-individualized mandatory juvenile life sentences,4 and 
to impose life sentences as the predominant form of sanction for juveniles 
who perpetrate homicide offenses.5 
As an illustration of the operation of the one-way ratchet, in Kennedy v. Lou-
isiana,6 the United States Supreme Court found that Louisiana’s child rape 
death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it contravened society’s 
	
 1 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.). 
 2 J. Richard Broughton, Kennedy and the Tail of Minos, 69 LA. L. REV. 593, 605 (2009). 
 3 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (finding that imposition of life without the possibility 
of parole sentences on juvenile offenders for non-homicide offenses violates the Eighth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution by running contrary to constitutional standards informed by so-
ciety’s evolving standards of decency). 
 4 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469, 476–77, 489 (2012) (finding that imposition of life without 
the possibility of parole sentences on juvenile offenders for homicide offenses in absence of an indi-
vidualized sentencing hearing that provides an opportunity to consider aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by running con-
trary to the constitutional standards established by the society’s evolving standards of decency). 
 5 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732–36 (2016) (interpreting Miller v. Alabama as a 
substantive rather than a procedural change, in part, based upon the conclusion that the decision 
substantially imposes requirements that mandate that life sentences for homicide offenses need not 
only be arrived at through an individualized process but also should be rare, requiring a filtering 
akin to second-stage capital filtering designed to only impose such sentences for the worst offenses 
and offenders). 
 6 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
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evolving standards of decency.7  As a result, other than by means of “a consti-
tutional amendment, [the] only way for capital child rape to become constitu-
tional would be through a new evolving national consensus in favor of such a 
punishment.”8  The structural challenge as observed by Professor Eric Posner 
is that the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence inhibits the develop-
ment of such a new consensus by creating “[t]he Eighth Amendment Ratchet 
Puzzle.”9  Professor Posner has artfully described that puzzle as follows: 
If people in the various states change their mind and come to believe that 
the punishment is justified, legislatures will not be able to enact the punish-
ment without violating the Constitution.  It seems likely that they will there-
fore not bother, and so a new consensus in the other direction cannot get 
started.  Perhaps, in the rare instances when a national consensus will de-
velop quickly, dozens of states will enact the law even though it violates the 
Constitution, and courts will recognize a change in the consensus.  But this 
is likely to be rare, and it loads the dice against national consensuses devel-
oping in favor of harsher punishments.10 
This quandary led Benjamin Wittes of the Brookings Institute to question 
what happens, as with executing child rapists, when states want to open the 
door for a practice that has been decades in disuse.  Is the Eighth Amend-
ment a one-way ratchet—a device that can remove punishments from the 
policy table but which never puts them back on it—or is there some mecha-
nism by which the court can acknowledge that societal mores sometimes 
evolve in a more punitive direction?11 
The United States Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudential 
framework has been largely understood to create a one-way ratchet, afford-
ing no workable solution for the states to solve the ratchet puzzle.12  For ex-
ample, Professor Tonja Jacobi has observed that the Supreme Court’s anal-
ysis “irreversibly imposes rules based on a potentially fleeting consensus” 
functioning as an “irreversible ratchet, increasingly restricting the application 
	
 7 Id. at 421, 435, 446 (concluding that application of the death penalty to offenders who commit the 
crime of child rape is an unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment by imposing a sen-
tence contrary to society’s evolving standards of decency for the type of offense). 
 8 Douglas A. Berman, In Alabama, the Kennedy Case Did Not End Talk of the Death Penalty for Child Rape, 
SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Feb. 16, 2009, 7:48 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_ 
and_policy/2009/02/in-alabama-the-kennedy-case-did-not-end-talk-of-the-death-penalty-for-
child-rape.html. 
 9 Eric Posner, The Eighth Amendment Ratchet Puzzle in Kennedy v. Louisiana, SLATE: CONVICTIONS 
(June 25, 2008, 11:06 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/convictions/2008/06/25/the_eighth_ 
amendment_ratchet_puzzle_in_kennedy_v_louisiana.html. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Benjamin Wittes, Unusual Nonsense, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 28, 2008, https://newrepub-
lic.com/article/64856/unusual-nonsense. 
 12 EVAN J. MANDERY, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: A BALANCED EXAMINATION 237 (2d 
ed. 2011) (characterizing the “existing doctrine” regarding the Eighth Amendment “as a one-way 
ratchet”).   
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of the death penalty”13 or other prohibited sanctions that run afoul of the 
Supreme Court’s evolving standards of decency jurisprudence.   
This Article attempts to provide a solution to the Eight Amendment 
ratchet puzzle, rendering reversible the seemingly irreversible ratchet.  In do-
ing so, the Article sets forth two critical mechanisms, contingent legislation 
and the active use of resolutions, which if utilized by state legislatures will en-
able them to more effectively engage in a constitutional dialogue with the 
United States Supreme Court with regard to defining societal evolving stand-
ards of decency.  To provide background for the discussion herein, this Article 
begins in Part I by tracing the historical origins and evolution of the prohibi-
tion upon cruel and unusual punishment with a special emphasis on the de-
velopment of proportionality analysis.  In exploring the evolution of the pro-
hibition upon cruel and unusual punishment, Part I journeys from the 
constitutional measure’s English Bill of Rights origins to the emergence of the 
modern interpretive jurisprudential framework for Eighth Amendment anal-
ysis, the evolving standards of decency, which have framed the proportional-
ity analysis.  Part II of the Article provides an overview of the mechanics for 
how the Supreme Court determines society’s evolving standard of decency.  
Part III of the Article challenges the commonly held, but inaccurate, assump-
tion that when considering the evolving standards of decency the arc of history 
is linear and societal moral evolution is necessarily a movement towards 
greater leniency.  In Part IV, this Article briefly addresses the policy distortion 
that the one-way ratchet can produce and then explains how contingent leg-
islation can be used by state legislatures in seeking to reverse the seemingly 
one-way ratchet fashioned by the Supreme Court’s evolving standards of de-
cency jurisprudence.  Part V explains why the Compact Clause of the Con-
stitution does not pose a barrier to the use of contingent legislation as a mech-
anism for state legislatures to more effectively engage with the Supreme Court 
through joint action.  Part VI briefly addresses how the active use of resolu-
tions by state legislators can further supplement the effectiveness of contingent 
legislation as means of more effectively empowering state legislators to engage 
with the Supreme Court in defining society’s evolving standards of decency.   
I.  HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE PROHIBITION UPON 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
	
 13 Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation as Evidence of an 
Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1123 (2006). 
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cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”14   As with the other first ten 
amendments to the United States Constitution, the Eighth Amendment 
emerged out of the struggle over ratification in the state conventions15 and 
through James Madison’s leadership in the First Congress.16  For a number 
of reasons including the absence of a Bill of Rights, there was especially 
strong concern that Virginia, a critical state to the survival of the fledgling 
American experiment, would not ratify the Constitution.17  Federalists, in-
cluding Madison, had not thought inclusion of such rights was necessary, and 
in-fact thought listing a series of individual rights would actually undermine 
individual liberty.18  However, as the leading tactician for ratification of the 
United States Constitution at Virginia’s state ratification convention, Madi-
son strategically agreed to the state convention recommending constitutional 
amendments so long as ratification of the Constitution in Virginia was not 
made contingent upon adoption of these proposed amendments.19  A major-
ity of the Virginia ratification convention, despite the presence of two leading 
anti-federalists Patrick Henry and George Mason, would eventually embrace 
this approach, ratifying the Constitution and submitting proposed amend-
ments to be considered by the First Congress.20 
George Mason served as a principal drafter of the Virginia ratification con-
vention’s proposed amendments to Congress.21  Mason’s proposals would in-
fluence other state ratifying conventions, providing “the template for many of 
	
 14 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 15 See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, 
at 255–319 (2011) (detailing the history of the Virginia ratification convention); Kurt T. Lash, The 
Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA L. REV. 801, 808 (2008) (noting that the Bill of 
Rights provisions all have their roots in proposals submitted by state ratifying conventions); see also 
infra Part I (addressing the emergence of the Eighth Amendment out of the proposals submitted by 
the Virginia ratifying convention). 
 16 See RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS 178–
240 (2006) (tracing Madison’s stewardship of the Bill of Rights through the First Congress); see also 
LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC 280–90 (1995) (same). 
 17 Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 
PEPP. L. REV. 661, 676–77 (2004). 
 18 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 288–338 (1996) (exploring the debate between federalists and anti-federalists over 
inclusion of individual rights in the Constitution); see also Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration 
124 Yale L. J. 576, 621–22 (2014) (explaining that Madison and others believed that enumeration 
would allow Congress to deny individual rights). 
 19 See MAIER, supra note 15, at 298 (addressing the tactical evolution of Madison’s position on pro-
posed amendments); James F. Kelley, Note, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 814, 819 (1966). 
 20 MAIER, supra note 15, at 225–27, 305–06; see also Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: 
A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 327 (1990) (recounting Madison’s promise to consider 
adopting a bill of rights should Virginia ratify the Constitution). 
 21 H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in Context: The Case of the Vanishing 
Predicate, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 434 (2000). 
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the proposals for amendments that emerged from the state ratifying conven-
tions.”22  In drafting the proposed amendments, Mason, who had also played 
a critical role in drafting the Virginia Declaration of Rights, drew extensively 
thereupon including for the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ments.23  Mason had borrowed the cruel and unusual punishment language of 
the Virginia Declaration of Rights from the language of the English Bill of 
Rights.24  In the First Congress, it would be Madison who would serve as the 
principal pen of the Bill of Rights.25  In formulating what was to become the 
Eighth Amendment, Madison drew upon the Virginia ratification conven-
tion’s proposal. 26   Madison’s “only modification of Virginia’s [proposed] 
amendment . . . was to substitute an imperative ‘shall not’ for the more horta-
tory ‘ought not to.’”27  Madison’s proposed amendment moved through the 
Congressional debates and adoption by the states without alteration, becoming 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.28  Thus, the prohi-
bition on cruel and unusual punishment in the United States Constitution 
traces its roots to the English Bill of Rights via Virginia’s Declaration of Rights.  
Enacted on December 16, 1689, the English Bill of Rights declared that 
“excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted.”29  Traditionally historians viewed the trea-
son trials of the Bloody Assizes of 1685 as having “spurred the adoption of the 
English Bill of Rights containing the progenitor of [the Eighth Amendment] 
	
 22 Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (2016). 
 23 Rumann, supra note 17, at 678.  In fact, the language of the Eighth Amendment was taken directly 
from the Virginia Declaration of Rights article I, section 9 (1776).  Jack Balderson, Jr., Comment, 
Temporal Units of Prosecution and Continuous Acts: Judicial and Constitutional Limitations, 36 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 195, 215 (1999) (citing VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. I, § 9 (1776)). 
 24 Balderson, Jr., supra note 23 at 215–16 (citing ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS, 1689, 1 W. & M. sess. 2, 
c. 2 (Eng.)). 
 25 See Paul L. Joffe, Conscience and Interest: Law, Rights, and Politics in the Struggle to Confront Climate Change 
and the New Poverty, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 269, 304 n.132 (2009) (noting that Madison served 
as “a principal draftsman” of the Bill of Rights); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: 
An Essay Concerning the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 
8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 942 (2003) (stating that Madison was the “principal 
drafter” of the Bill of Rights). 
 26 See Michael D. Dean, State Legislation and the “Evolving Standards of Decency”: Flaws in the Constitutional 
Review of Death Penalty Statutes, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 379, 384 (2010) (explaining that one of the 
provisions Madison presented “to the First Congress” was Virginia’s “‘cruel and unusual punish-
ments’ provision” which subsequently became the Eighth Amendment). 
 27 Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 128 (2004). 
 28 Elizabeth Salisbury Warren, Note, The Case for Applying the Eighth Amendment to Corporations, 49 VAND. 
L. REV. 1313, 1327 (1996). 
 29 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing ENGLISH BILL OF 
RIGHTS, 1689, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2 (Eng.); 8 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS: 1660-1714, 
at 122 (Andrew Browning ed. 1953)). 
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prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.”30  Over the course of Lord 
Chief Justice George Jeffreys’ reign of terror, known as the Bloody Assizes, 
[n]obody knows how many hundreds of men, innocent or of unproved guilt, 
[were] sent to their deaths in the pseudo trials that followed [the Duke of] 
Monmouth’s . . . attempt to seize the throne. . . . Mere death was considered 
much too mild for the villagers and farmers rounded up in these raids.  The 
directions to a high sheriff were to provide an ax, a cleaver, “a furnace or 
cauldron to boil their heads and quarters, and soil to boil therewith, half a 
bushel to each traitor, and tar to tar them with, and a sufficient number of 
spears and poles to fix their heads and quarters” along the highways.  One 
could have crossed a good part of northern England by their guidance.31 
However, beginning in the 1960s, a historical reinterpretation began to 
emerge that it was not so much the Bloody Assizes but instead the Titus Oates 
affair as to which the English Bill of Rights was more heavily oriented.32 
Titus Oates, a Protestant cleric, gave perjured testimony accusing a num-
ber of Catholics of conspiring to overthrow King Charles II.33  His testimony 
resulted in their convictions and executions; tragically, it was discovered too 
late that Oates had lied.34  Fifteen innocent men had already died.35  In 1685, 
Oates was convicted of perjury.36  At his sentencing, Lord Chief Justice Jef-
freys, who had also presided over the Bloody Assizes, “deemed it unfortunate 
	
 30 Id. at 317 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION 650 (5th ed. 1891) (1833)). 
 31 Id. at 254 (Douglas, J. concurring) (quoting IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN 
AND MEANING 154–55 (1965)). By way of further background: 
The Bloody Assizes followed the failed attempt by Charles II’s illegitimate son, the Duke 
of Monmouth, to overthrow his uncle, James II, as King.  Monmouth was executed, as 
were hundreds of his supporters.  Judge Jeffreys, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, pre-
sided over the trials of the rebels.  Some rebels were transported to penal servitude in the 
West Indies.  Many rebels, however, were sentenced to gruesome death penalties, includ-
ing drawing and quartering, hanging until not quite dead, disembowelment, beheading, 
and burning alive.  Further, the property of those found guilty was forfeited to the Crown.  
Pamphlets recounting the names and sufferings of the victims were published as part of the 
‘revolutionary propaganda’ during the Glorious Revolution of 1688.   
  Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 565, 569 
n.11 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 32 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 968–75 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (addressing the 
changing historical understanding of the “cruell and unusuall Punishments” provision of the Eng-
lish Bill of Rights with regard to Bloody Assize and the Titus Oates affair); Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. at 274–75 n.17 (Brennan, J. concurring) (noting that the same provision arose in response to 
the Oates’ case); Furman, 408 U.S. at 318 n.13 (Marshall, J., concurring) (acknowledging Professor 
Granucci’s view that the trial of Titus Oates was the impetus behind the adoption of the clause); see 
also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (“Historians have viewed the English provision 
as a reaction either to the ‘Bloody Assize,’ the treason trials conducted by Chief Justice Jeffreys in 
1685 after the abortive rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth, or to the perjury prosecution of Titus 
Oates in the same year.”).   
 33 Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, When the Federal Death Penalty Is “Cruel and Unusual,” 74 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 819, 833 (2006). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
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that the death penalty could no longer be imposed for perjury, but asserted 
that ‘crimes of this nature are left to be punished according to the discretion 
of the court, so far as that the judgment extend not to life or member.’”37  
Oates was sentenced to “pay a fine of two thousand marks, to be defrocked, 
to be pilloried four times annually, to be whipped ‘from Aldgate to Newgate’ 
on May 20 to be whipped ‘from Newgate to Tyburn’ on May 22, and to life 
imprisonment.”38  Thus, despite the legislative prohibition on imposing the 
death penalty for perjury, Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys imposed precisely such 
a penalty, for he “did not expect Oates to survive the whipping.”39 
Just as division exists over whether the English Bill of Rights should be 
considered to be a reaction primarily to the Bloody Assizes or to the Oates 
affair, the interpretation given to the meaning of the English Bill of Rights in 
seeking to understand the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and un-
usual punishment has been correspondingly divided.  Justice Antonin Scalia 
in Harmelin v. Michigan and Justice Edward White in his dissent in Weems v. 
United States offer strong arguments against the English Bill of Rights having 
included proportionality review within the restriction on cruel and unusual 
punishment.40  However, Justice Powell writing for the Court in Solem v. Helm 
offered a strong retort: 
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of proportionality in 
language that was later adopted in the Eighth Amendment: “excessive Baile 
ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall 
Punishments inflicted.”  Although the precise scope of this provision is un-
certain, it at least incorporated “the longstanding principle of English law 
that the punishment . . . should not be, by reason of its excessive length or 
severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged.”41 
This same view was embraced by the joint opinion in Gregg v. Georgia: “The 
English version appears to have been directed against punishments unauthor-
ized by statute and beyond the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, as well as 
those disproportionate to the offense involved.”42  This understanding of the 
	
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 833–34. 
 40 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 968–75 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (arguing that the 
provision of the English Bill of Rights was designed to prohibit illegal sentences like those imposed 
on Oates rather than disproportionate punishments in general); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349, 390–93, 390 n.1 (1910) (White, J. dissenting) (arguing that the English Bill of Rights was de-
signed to guard against illegal punishments like those inflicted on Oates). 
 41 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1983) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 
RICHARD L. PERRY, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 236 (1959)) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *16–19).  
 42 428 U.S. 153, 169–70 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (citing Anthony F. 
Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 
860 (1969)). 
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English Bill of Rights, as reflecting at least in part an opposition to dispropor-
tionate sentencing, owes greatly to the historical scholarship of Professor An-
thony Granucci and his 1969 article, which was published in the California 
Law Review, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning.43 
Granucci’s scholarship, however, offers support for both sides of the pro-
portionality debate, for according to Granucci, “Americans at the time of the 
founding misinterpreted the English punishments clause as being concerned 
with particularly gruesome methods of punishment, perhaps because they 
were misled by an erroneous reading of Blackstone.”44  The Framers of the 
Bill of Rights “assumed that the modes of punishment inflicted in the Bloody 
Assizes, including quartering and embowelling, were the motivation for the 
cruel and unusual provision of the English Bill.”45  Recalling that the cruel 
and unusual punishment guarantee arrived in the United States Constitution 
by way of Virginia’s Declaration of Rights, we may turn to Patrick Henry 
and George Mason from the committee that advanced the language eventu-
ally used by Madison to further enliven the original understanding of the 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.  Both addressed the language 
as prohibiting barbaric punishments and torture but neither referenced pro-
portionality.  Patrick Henry stated: 
In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the re-
striction of not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and in-
flicting cruel and unusual punishments.  These are prohibited by your dec-
laration of rights. What has distinguished our ancestors?—That they would 
not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment.  But Congress 
may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the com-
mon law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Ger-
many—of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime.  They will say that 
they might as well draw examples from those countries as from Great Brit-
ain, and they will tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the 
arm of government, that they must have a criminal equity, and extort con-
fession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless severity.  We 
are then lost and undone.46 
	
 43 See Joshua E. Kastenberg, An Enlightened Addition to the Original Meaning: Voltaire and the Eighth Amend-
ment’s Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 5 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 49 (1995) 
(noting that “all of Furman’s concurring opinions cited Anthony F. Granucci’s important 1969 
article”); Michael P. O’Shea, Purposeless Restraints: Fourteenth Amendment Rationality Scrutiny and the Con-
stitutional Review of Prison Sentences, 72 TENN. L. REV. 1041, 1073–74 n.203 (2005) (noting White’s 
reliance on Granucci’s article in Harmelin). 
 44 Note, Original Meaning and Its Limits, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1279, 1290 (2007) (citing Granucci, supra 
note 42, at 860–65). 
 45 Stephen T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 
68 TENN. L. REV. 41, 46 (2000). 
 46 Rumann, supra note 17, at 677 (quoting 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 447–48 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1888) (1827)). 
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Similarly, addressing an argument that the Virginia Declaration of Rights did 
not safeguard against torture, Mason added that “the worthy gentleman was 
mistaken in his assertion that the bill of rights did not prohibit torture . . . . An-
other clause of the bill of rights provided that no cruel and unusual punishments 
shall be inflicted; therefore, torture was included in the prohibition.”47  As noted 
by the joint opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, whereas the English Bill of Rights in-
cluded a restriction on disproportionate sentencing, “[t]he American drafts-
men, who adopted the English phrasing in drafting the Eighth Amendment, 
were primarily concerned . . . with proscribing ‘tortures’ and other ‘barbarous’ 
methods of punishment.”48  It was the method of punishment that was squarely 
in the Framers’ focus.49  It appears that “[t]he American clause . . . originally 
prohibited only ‘tortuous or barbaric punishments’ . . .[and] was not intended 
by the Framers to prohibit excessive punishments.”50 
A rejoinder, however, has been offered pointing towards a broader under-
standing of the Framers’ intentions.  Essentially, this view arises from honoring 
the Framers’ object—securing the traditional rights of Englishmen.  These 
rights included restrictions on disproportionate punishment.  Thus, as noted 
by the Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm, “[w]hen the Framers of the Eighth 
Amendment adopted the language of the English Bill of Rights, they also 
adopted the English principle of proportionality.  Indeed, one of the consistent 
themes of the era was that Americans had all the rights of English subjects.”51  
It has been argued that “[t]he founding generation’s failure to have more pub-
lic conversations about what the Eighth Amendment meant suggests that 
many of its members were uncritically claiming a liberty of their heritage, and 
expected it to mean what it had always meant.”52  In other words, “the Amer-
ican framers and ratifiers understood themselves simply to be incorporating 
the English provision, whatever its content, into American law.”53  Therefore, 
the argument is that even if the Framers did not understand that proportion-
ality review was part of the restriction shaped by the English guarantee against 
cruel and unusual punishment, they, nevertheless, incorporated this restriction 
by seeking to preserve the traditional rights and liberties of Englishmen. 
	
 47 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION  452 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1888) (1827). 
 48 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169–70 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (citing 
Granucci, supra note 42, at 842). 
 49 See Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 
635, 636–37 (1966) (arguing that the Framers designed the Eighth Amendment to eliminate cruel 
methods of punishment). 
 50 Michael J. O’Connor, Note, What Would Darwin Say?: The Mis-Evolution of the Eighth Amendment, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1389, 1392 (2003). 
 51 463 U.S. 277, 285–86 (1983). 
 52 Claus, supra note 27, at 134. 
 53 Note, Original Meaning and Its Limits, supra note 44, at 1290. 
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The United States Congress on August 17, 1789 addressed Madison’s 
proposal for a constitutional amendment that would eventually become the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.54  Only two members 
of Congress, both from the House of Representatives, were recorded as rising 
to speak on the merits of the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition, and 
both of them were opponents thereof.55  Representative William Smith56 of 
South Carolina “objected to the words ‘nor cruel and unusual punishments;’ 
the import of them being too indefinite.”57  Representative Samuel Liver-
more of New Hampshire offered the following critique: 
The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I 
have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not 
think it necessary.  What is meant by the terms excessive bail?  Who are to 
be the judges?  What is understood by excessive fines?  It lies with the court 
to determine.  No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is some-
times necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps 
having their ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting 
these punishments because they are cruel?  If a more lenient mode of cor-
recting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could be in-
vented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we 
have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from 
making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.58 
With no additional recorded debate, the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution was approved.59  Accordingly, as noted by Justice Wil-
liam O. Douglas, “the debates of the First Congress on the Bill of Rights 
throw little light on [the] intended meaning” of the prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment.60  We do, however, know that “the death penalty was 
legal in all thirteen states in 1789, and, one year later, the First Congress itself 
	
 54 See Claus, supra note 27, at 128 (recounting the proceedings of the vote on the proposed amend-
ment). 
 55 See William J. Brennan, Jr., Lecture, Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the 
Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 323 (1986) (concluding that scholars cannot know which punish-
ments the framers considered cruel or unusual given the scarcity of contemporary congressional 
debate on the subject); see also Raoul Berger, Death Penalties and Hugo Bedau: A Crusading Philosopher 
Goes Overboard, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 863, 868–69 (1984) (discussing the Framers’ possible mindset while 
adopting the Eighth Amendment). 
 56 Representative William Smith of South Carolina was originalist in terms of constitutional construc-
tion; he believed that  
“the words” of the text were to be interpreted based on “the general sense of the whole 
nation at the time the Constitution was formed . . . . [B]y referring to the contemporane-
ous expositions of that instrument, when the subject was viewed only in relation to the 
abstract power . . . we should come at the truth.” 
  Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of “This Constitution,” 72 
IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1199 (1987).   
 57 Claus, supra note 27, at 128 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)). 
 58 Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)). 
 59 Id. (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)). 
 60 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 244 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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enacted legislation which punished by death the crimes of murder, robbery, 
rape, and forgery of public securities.”61 
The first judicial attempts at defining cruel and unusual punishment in 
the United States arose not in federal courts but in state courts.  These early 
forays into interpreting the constitutional prohibition upon cruel and unusual 
punishment provide a meaningful sense of the early judicial understanding 
thereof in the United States.  In considering these early state court decisions, 
there is cause for caution insofar as there exists a question of whether cruel 
and unusual means the same thing under the respective state constitutions as 
it does under the federal constitution, especially given that states were not at 
this time obligated to adhere to the Eighth Amendment.62  However, there 
is little to suggest that state courts of the era regarded cruel and unusual pun-
ishment as potentially meaning something different under their state consti-
tutions than the federal constitution,63 which would be a greater concern for 
post-1970s decisions in light of modern judicial state constitutional judicial 
federalism.64  Ultimately, these early state court opinions offer valuable in-
sight into the American judiciary’s early understanding of the prohibition 
upon cruel and unusual punishment.   
In 1824 the General Court of Virginia ruled that the cruel and unusual 
punishment restriction was applicable to the mode of punishment and not to 
determining whether the punishment was excessive.65  In reflecting upon this 
conclusion, it is worth recalling that the Virginia Bill of Rights, the 
interpretation of which was before the General Court of Virginia, provided 
	
 61 Alan I. Bigel, Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall on Capital Punishment: Its Constitution-
ality, Morality, Deterrent Effect, and Interpretation by the Court, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
13, 34 (1994). 
By the first Crimes Act of the United States, forgery of public securities, or knowingly 
uttering forged public securities with intent to defraud, as well as treason, murder, piracy, 
mutiny, robbery, or rescue of a person convicted of a capital crime, was punishable with 
death; most other offenses were punished by fine and imprisonment; whipping was part of 
the punishment of stealing or falsifying records, fraudulently acknowledging bail, larceny 
of goods, or receiving stolen goods; disqualification to hold office was part of the punish-
ment of bribery; and those convicted of perjury or subornation of perjury, besides being 
fined and imprisoned, were to stand in the pillory for one hour, and rendered incapable of 
testifying in any court of the United States. 
  Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 427 (1885) (citing Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112–17 (1790); 
Mr. Justice Wilson’s Charge to the Grand Jury in 1791, in 3 WILSON’S WORKS 380–81 (n.d.)). 
 62 Cf. Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to Define Religion Under the First Amendment and 
the Contributions and Insights of Other Disciplines of Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and 
Anthropology, 83 N.D. L. REV. 123, 165 (2007) (making a corresponding observation regarding the 
term “religion” in the First Amendment and state constitutions). 
 63 Cf. id. (making a similar observation concerning the First Amendment and state constitutions). 
 64 Cf. Jeffrey Omar Usman, The Game is Afoot: Constitutionalizing the Right to Hunt and Fish in the Tennessee 
Constitution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 57, 98–101 (2009) (tracing the rise of judicial federalism starting in 
the 1970s). 
 65 Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 449–50 (1824). 
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the basis for the Eighth Amendment.  In reaching its conclusion, the General 
Court of Virginia stated: 
As to the ninth section of the Bill of Rights, denouncing cruel and unusual 
punishments, we have no notion that it has any bearing on this case.  That 
provision was never designed to control the Legislative right to determine ad 
libitum66 upon the adequacy of punishment, but is merely applicable to the 
modes of punishment.  We had existed for a considerable time as a commu-
nity, regulated by Laws guarded by Penal sanctions, when this Bill of Rights 
was declared.  We consider these sanctions as sufficiently rigorous, and we 
knew that the best heads and hearts of the land of our ancestors, had long 
and loudly declaimed against the wanton cruelty of many of the punishments 
practised in other countries; and this section in the Bill of Rights, was framed 
effectually to exclude these, so that no future Legislature, in a moment per-
haps of great and general excitement, should be tempted to disgrace our 
Code by the introduction of any of those odious modes of punishment.67 
The Georgia Supreme Court also concluded that it was province of the leg-
islature, not the courts, to determine whether a punishment was excessive 
and that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was addressed to 
the mode of punishment, not the proportionality thereof.68  The Georgia Su-
preme Court stated: 
Whether the law is unconstitutional, a violation of that article of the Consti-
tution which declares excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel and unu-
sual punishments inflicted, is another question.  The latter clause was, doubt-
less, intended to prohibit the barbarities of quartering, hanging in chains, 
castration, etc.  When adopted by the framers of the Constitution of the 
United States, larceny was generally punished by hanging; forgeries, burgla-
ries, etc., in the same way, for, be it remembered, penitentiaries are of modern 
origin, and I doubt if it ever entered into the mind of men of that day, that a 
crime such as this witness makes the defendant guilty of deserved a less pen-
alty than the Judge has inflicted.  It would be an interference with matters left 
by the Constitution to the legislative department of the government, for us to 
undertake to weigh the propriety of this or that penalty fixed by the Legisla-
ture for specific offenses.  So long as they do not provide cruel and unusual 
punishments, such as disgraced the civilization of former ages, and make one 
shudder with horror to read of them, as drawing, quartering, burning, etc., 
the Constitution does not put any limit upon legislative discretion.69 
The Virginia and Georgia courts’ interpretation of the restriction upon 
cruel and unusual punishment is broadly reflective of the analysis of their 
sister state courts that addressed the meaning of the prohibition upon cruel 
and unusual punishment during the 1800s.  For example, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court determined that extreme deference to the legislature was 
necessary when interpreting this restriction: 
	
 66 Ad libitum is Latin for “[a]t pleasure.”  Ad libitum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 67 Aldridge, 2 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) at 449–50. 
 68 See Whitten v. State, 47 Ga. 297, 301 (1872) (holding that the Eighth Amendment was designed to 
prohibit certain types of punishments rather than disproportional ones). 
 69 Id. 
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No doubt the principles of humanity sanctioned and enjoined in this section 
ought to command the reverence and regulate the conduct of all who owe 
obedience to the constitution.  But when the legislature, acting upon their 
oaths, . . . prescribe the punishments to be inflicted in case of crime; as the 
reasonableness or excess, the justice or cruelty of these are necessarily ques-
tions of discretion, it is not easy to see how this discretion can be supervised 
by a co-ordinate branch of the government.  Without attempting a definitive 
solution of this very perplexing question, it may at least be safely concluded 
that unless the act complained of (which it would be almost indecent to sup-
pose) contains such a flagrant violation of all discretion as to show a disregard 
of constitutional restraints it cannot be pronounced by the judiciary void be-
cause of repugnancy to the constitution.70 
In 1855, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts went even further 
than the North Carolina Supreme Court: “The question whether the pun-
ishment is too severe, and disproportionate to the offence, is for the legisla-
ture to determine.”71  Similarly, the California Supreme Court in 1860 de-
termined that “[t]he power over the whole subject of punishment for crime 
is vested in the Legislature.  The only limitation upon its exercise is the inhi-
bition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, which are held 
to mean those of a barbarous character, and unknown to the common law.”72  
Nine years later, the Supreme Court for the New Mexico Territory offered 
the following assessment: 
The word cruel, as used in the amendatory article of the constitution, was 
no doubt intended to prohibit a resort to the process of torture, resorted to 
so many centuries as a means of extorting confessions from suspected crim-
inals, under the sanction of the civil law.  It was never designed to abridge 
or limit the selection by the law-making power of such kind of punishment 
as was deemed most effective in the punishment and suppression of 
crime. . . . However averse the court may be to this mode of punishment, it 
cannot authorize the court in disregarding and annulling the law providing 
for the punishment of this crime, and, until repealed, it is the duty of the 
court to enforce it.73 
In other words, the earliest interpretations of the prohibition upon cruel and 
unusual punishment reflect either an extremely deferential view of the court’s 
role in proportionality analysis, as illustrated by the North Carolina Supreme 
Court, or more commonly a determination that the restriction upon cruel 
and unusual punishment excludes certain methods of punishment but does 
not empower courts to conduct a proportionality review. 
Unlike its state counterparts, “[i]n the century following the Eighth 
Amendment’s ratification in 1791, the Supreme Court rarely commented on 
	
 70 State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. (4 Dev. & Bat.) 144, 162 (1838). 
 71 Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 482, 486 (1855). 
 72 State v. McCauley, 15 Cal. 429, 455 (1860). 
 73 Garcia v. Territory of New Mexico, 1 N.M. 415, 418–19 (1869). 
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[the Eighth Amendment’s] meaning and applicability.”74  In fact, the Su-
preme Court did not interpret the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause on 
the merits until 187875 when the Court considered Wilkerson v. Utah.76  The 
Court via its Wilkerson v. Utah decision limited the reach of Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause to excluding particularly barbaric punishments with its 
analysis “focused on the historical recognition of cruel punishments rather 
than on contemporary standards.”77  In Wilkerson v. Utah, the Court consid-
ered the arguments of a defendant who had been sentenced to death under 
a statute that provided that “any person convicted of murder in the first de-
gree ‘shall suffer death,’” and that “the several sections of this code, which 
declare certain crimes to be punishable as therein mentioned, devolve a duty 
upon the court authorized to pass sentence to determine and impose the pun-
ishment prescribed.”78  With Wilkerson having been found guilty of first de-
gree murder, the trial court utilized its discretion to determine the method of 
execution; the defendant would be publicly shot.79  In reviewing a challenge 
to this sentence as being cruel and unusual, the Supreme Court noted that 
“[d]ifficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the 
constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments 
shall not be inflicted.”80  However, the Court concluded that it was “safe to 
affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of un-
necessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution.”81  
Publicly shooting Wilkerson did not, however, violate the prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment.82 
The Supreme Court’s next foray into interpreting the prohibition upon 
cruel and unusual punishment arose a little over a decade later.  The defend-
ant in In re Kemmler invoked the protections of the Eighth Amendment to argue 
“the character of the penalty,” that is the use of electrocution as the method 
by which he was to be executed, constituted a cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.83  The Supreme Court noted that 
“[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but 
the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used 
	
 74 Brian W. Varland, Marking the Progress of a Maturing Society: Reconsidering the Constitutionality of Death 
Penalty Application in Light of Evolving Standards of Decency, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 312, 314 (2005). 
 75 See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 481 (2017) (explaining 
that the United States Supreme Court did not consider whether a punishment ran afoul of the 
Eighth Amendment until 1878). 
 76 99 U.S. 130 (1878). 
 77 Varland, supra note 74, at 314–15. 
 78 Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 132. 
 79 Id. at 131. 
 80 Id. at 135–36. 
 81 Id. at 136. 
 82 Id. 
 83 136 U.S. 436, 441–42 (1890). 
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in the Constitution.  It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, 
something more than the mere extinguishment of life.”84  The Supreme Court ac-
cepted the New York state courts’ analysis that electrocution may be unusual, 
insofar as it was then new, but that because it was enacted as part of legislative 
effort to utilize a more humane means of execution it certainly could not be 
said to be cruel.85  Accordingly, death by electrocution did not constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment and did not violate the Eighth Amendment.86 
Though Chief Justice Warren’s 1958 plurality opinion in Trop v. Dulles is 
often referenced as the origin point for the concept of an evolving standard 
of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, rightly the tale begins with 
Supreme Court’s decision half-a-century earlier in Weems v. United States.87  
Prior to Weems, the Supreme “Court interpreted the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment Clause only to prohibit modes of punishment that were barbaric and 
cruel.”88  Weems incorporated proportionality review into the Court’s analysis 
of cruel and unusual punishment.89  The Weems Court was not addressing a 
capital case but instead a sentence in the Philippines, then under the control 
of the United States, imposing a harsh punishment for the crime of falsifying 
a public document.90  To be guilty of the offense, it was  
not necessary that there be any fraud nor even the desire to defraud, nor 
intention of personal gain on the part of the person committing it, that a 
falsification of a public document be punishable; it is sufficient that the one 
who committed it had the intention to pervert the truth and to falsify the 
document, and that by it damage might result to a third party.91   
The minimum sentence for this offense consisted of “confinement in a penal 
institution for twelve years and one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist of the 
offender, hard and painful labor, no assistance from friend or relative, no 
marital authority or parental rights or rights of property, no participation 
even in the family council.”92   
In addressing the offense and its harsh punishment, the Court observed 
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause that it “may be . . . progressive, 
	
 84 Id. at 447 (emphasis added). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 448–49. 
 87 217 U.S. 349 (1910).   
 88 Douglas L. Simon, Making Sense of Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A New Approach to Reconciling Military 
and Civilian Eighth Amendment Law, 184 MIL. L. REV. 66, 70 (2005). 
 89 Chris Baniszewski, Comment, Supreme Court Review of Excessive Prison Sentences: The Eighth Amendment’s 
Proportionality Requirement, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 929, 941 (1993) (“Although Weems v. United States was not 
the first Supreme Court case to address the proportionality principle, it was the first case in which 
the Court suggested that the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality principle.”  (footnote 
omitted)). 
 90 Paul Weems, convicted of having falsified a public and official document, listed sums of money as 
having been paid out on an official ledger that were not.  Weems, 217 U.S. at 362–63.   
 91 Id. at 363.   
 92 Id. at 366. 
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and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opin-
ion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”93  The Court offered a living 
constitution interpretive understanding of the Eight Amendment prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishment as a restriction that grows and changes 
with the nation and the times: 
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from 
an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be nec-
essarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken.  Time works 
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.  Therefore a 
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief 
which gave it birth.  This is peculiarly true of constitutions.  They are not 
ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions.  They are, to use 
the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “designed to approach immortality as 
nearly as human institutions can approach it.”  The future is their care and 
provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can 
be made.  In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation 
cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.  Under any other rule 
a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient 
in efficacy and power.  Its general principles would have little value and be 
converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas.  Rights declared 
in words might be lost in reality.  And this has been recognized.  The mean-
ing and vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and re-
strictive construction.94 
Using this evolving interpretive approach, the Court determined that the pun-
ishment was cruel and unusual.95  The reach of the Weems Court’s evolving 
proportionality jurisprudence, however, remained limited for decades be-
cause (1) the unusual character of the punishment, especially the conditions 
of confinement and the accessory civil penalties such as stripping parental, 
marital, and property rights suggested that this was perhaps a method of pun-
ishment case;96 (2) the Supreme Court itself was disinclined to return to or 
extend Weems;97 and (3) Justice White’s dissent in Weems effectively attacked 
	
 93 Id. at 378. 
 94 Id. at 373.   
 95 Id. at 372–78, 382. 
 96 See Baniszewski, supra note 89, at 941 (describing the unusually harsh penalty inflicted on Weems); 
Parr, supra note 45, at 52–53 (positing that, because of the unusual penalty in Weems, the Court 
cabined its holding to the facts of the case); Charles Walter Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality 
Analysis and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 378, 385 (1980) 
(arguing “that the most reasonable reading of Weems is that the various factors discussed coalesced 
in both condition and intensity of punishment to violate the eighth amendment’s prohibition.”). 
 97 See Baniszewski, supra note 89, at 942 (explaining that the ambiguous reasoning in Weems diminished 
its precedential value); James S. Campbell, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-Punish-
ment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REV. 996, 1006–07 (1964) (lamenting that the Court 
gave Weems only occasional treatment until 1962); Norman J. Finkel, Prestidigitation, Statistical Magic, 
and Supreme Court Numerology in Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 612, 616 
(1995) (explaining that the Court rarely revisited Weems despite its significance). 
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the majority determination that the prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ment included a role for the courts in conducting a proportionality review.98   
While a malleable rather than fixed Eighth Amendment and proportion-
ality review were first accepted by the Supreme Court in Weems, it is in an-
other non-capital case in which the interpretive structure of the modern 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudential framework was forged.  Recognizing that 
the Weems Court had found that the words of the Eighth Amendment “are 
not precise, and that their scope is not static,” the plurality in Trop v. Dulles 
concluded that the cruel and unusual punishment provision, accordingly, 
“must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.”99  The Court in Trop had before it the 
conviction of Albert Trop, a soldier who deserted during a time of war and 
who was punished with losing his citizenship.100  The Court found that Trop 
could not be deprived of his citizenship.101  The plurality offered two foun-
dations for this determination: (1) a person could voluntarily renounce their 
citizenship, but, the government did not have the power to remove some-
one’s citizenship, and (2) rendering an individual stateless constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment.102  It is the later basis in which the Court evoked 
the concept of evolving standards of decency to support its conclusion, laying 
the foundation for subsequent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.103   
II.  ASSESSING THE EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY 
The emergence of proportionality review ensures that “the Eighth 
Amendment bars not only those punishments that are ‘barbaric’ but also 
	
 98 Paul R. Baier, The Supreme Court, Justinian, and Antonin Scalia: Twenty Years in Retrospect, 67 LA. L. REV. 
489, 520 n.108 (2007) (recounting Justice Scalia’s acknowledgment that he had borrowed the argu-
ment from Justice White’s Weems dissent to formulate his own dissent from an Eight Amendment 
case); Michael P. O’Shea, Purposeless Restraints: Fourteenth Amendment Rationality Scrutiny and the Consti-
tutional Review of Prison Sentences, 72 TENN. L. REV. 1041, 1056 (2005) (crediting Justice White’s dis-
sent as a “powerful originalist analysis”); Parr, supra note 45, at 51–52 (describing Justice White’s 
vociferous dissent from the Weems). 
 99 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 100 Id. at 87–91; see also Simon, supra note 88, at 72 (explaining that Trop’s desertion as a U.S. soldier 
in French Morocco resulted in his statelessness). 
 101 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100–03 (plurality opinion). 
 102 Id. at 92–93, 102–04; see also Michael J. O’Connor, supra note 50, at 1393–94 (summarizing the 
holding and reasoning in Trop).  Justice Brennan, who authored the concurring opinion in the case, 
did not rely upon the cruel and unusual foundation but instead concluded that the punishment 
simply did not bear a rational relationship to the power that Congress was supposedly utilizing to 
impose this sanction.  Trop, 356 U.S. at 105–14 (Brennan, J. concurring). 
 103 See, e.g., Varland, supra note 74, at 316–17 (explaining that Trop’s “evolving standards of decency” 
would provide the accepted framework in death penalty cases); David J. Pfeffer, Comment, Depriving 
America of Evolving Its Own Standards of Decency?: An Analysis of the Use of Foreign Law in Eighth Amendment 
Jurisprudence and Its Effect on Democracy, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 855, 870 (2007) (stating that “Trop v. Dulles 
set the standard by which ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ is examined by the Supreme Court”). 
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those that are ‘excessive’ in relation to the crime committed.”104  Assessing 
proportionality in accordance with evolving societal standards of decency en-
sures that courts assess whether “[a] claim that punishment is exces-
sive . . . not by the standards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys pre-
sided over the ‘Bloody Assizes’ or [even] when the Bill of Rights was adopted, 
but rather by those that currently prevail.”105   
In order to interpret the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment, the Supreme Court has “established the propriety and affirmed 
the necessity of referring to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society’ to determine which punishments are so dis-
proportionate as to be cruel and unusual.”106  This provides for a “flexible 
and dynamic” approach to the Eighth Amendment.107  Its shifting parame-
ters are driven by “an assessment of contemporary values concerning the in-
fliction of a challenged sanction.”108 
However, understanding that evolving societal standards of decency 
emerge from contemporary values does not answer the question of how 
courts are to determine what those values are.  Framing the parameters of 
this exploration, the Supreme Court has delineated its role: “[O]ur job is to 
identify the ‘evolving standards of decency’; to determine, not what they 
should be, but what they are.”109  It is extremely important that “these Eighth 
Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective 
views of individual Justices.”110  Accordingly, “this assessment does not call 
for a subjective judgment.  It requires, rather, that we look to objective indicia 
that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction.”111  Thus, “[p]ropor-
tionality review under those evolving standards should be informed by ‘ob-
jective factors to the maximum possible extent.’”112   
	
 104 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 105 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002); see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) 
(“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s proscriptions are not limited to those practices condemned by the 
common law in 1789.”  (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, 
Powell, & Stevens, JJ.))). 
 106 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 107 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.). 
 108 Id. at 173. 
 109 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989) (emphasis omitted). 
 110 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 111 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.). 
 112 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274–75 (1980) (empha-
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The Coker v. Georgia Court in 1977 explained that objective factors in-
cluded “public attitudes concerning a particular sentence,” “legislative atti-
tudes,” and “the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions.”113  
The Supreme Court, however, has in later years indicated that “[t]he clearest 
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation 
enacted by the country’s legislatures.”114  The Supreme Court reiterated this 
conclusion in Atkins v. Virginia wherein the Court noted that it had “pin-
pointed that the ‘clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contempo-
rary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures’”115 and 
again in Roper v. Simmons.116  In assessing whether a national consensus exists, 
the Supreme Court has indicated that “[i]t is not so much the number of 
these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of 
change.”117  The Court, however, has cautioned that “the objective evidence, 
though of great importance, [does] not ‘wholly determine’ the controversy, 
‘for the Constitution contemplates that in the end [the Court’s] own judg-
ment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death 
penalty under the Eighth Amendment.’”118 
Through this last component, the Supreme Court reflects upon the “cul-
pability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, 
along with the severity of the punishment in question.”119  The Court has taken 
the view that “a punishment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if it . . . makes 
no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is 
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffer-
ing.”120  The Court’s “test has turned to ideas about penology and proportion-
ality, considering the cruel and unusual nature of the . . . penalty imposed on 
a class of offenders by the penalty’s furtherance of deterrence and retribution 
and by its proportionality to the severity of the offender’s crime and to his cul-
pability.”121  The Court has, however, never utilized its “own judgment” in 
contravention of what it has found to be the objective measure of society’s con-
temporary moral values as a basis for striking down legislation under the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause.  Nor would the Court be on solid ground in 
	
 113 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. 
 114 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 
(2002). 
 115 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331). 
 116 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (“The beginning point is a review of objective indicia 
of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the 
question.  These data give us essential instruction.”).   
 117 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 566 (using the same language). 
 118 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion)). 
 119 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010). 
 120 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. 
 121 See Susan M. Raeker-Jordan, Parsing Personal Predilections: A Fresh Look at the Supreme Court’s Cruel and 
Unusual Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 58 ME. L. REV. 100, 103 (2006) (discussing the death penalty). 
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doing so given that the constitutional ballast for the living constitution analysis 
of its evolving standards jurisprudence is that the government is acting in con-
travention of society’s contemporary moral values in a manner that is cruel 
and unusual.  If a state legislature is not acting in contravention of contempo-
rary moral values as objectively assessed, then the living constitution evolving 
standards of decency based prohibition loses its grounding. 
III.  MORAL EVOLUTION IS NEITHER LINEAR NOR NECESSARILY 
TOWARDS LESS STRINGENT PUNISHMENT 
The concept of “moral progress is . . . deeply embedded in American cul-
ture”122 and part of the cultural undercurrent animating the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  The evolving standards of decency can be envi-
sioned as a judicial embrace of a progressivist view of history, a constant 
march, with perhaps a few setbacks, towards reducing sanctions by a morally 
evolved people through a societal realization of the excesses of punishment.123  
As a descriptive matter, “a characterization of history as sequential and pro-
gressive, moving inevitably toward more humane and enlightened attitudes, 
is not accurate.  Cyclic processes are far closer to the truth.”124  Offering a 
cautionary analysis of the progressive leniency understanding of evolving 
standards of decency in the context of capital punishment, which is one of the 
most inviting targets for the linear assumption, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
in Thompson v. Oklahoma offered evidence of contrary historical development: 
The history of the death penalty instructs that there is danger in inferring 
a settled societal consensus from statistics like those relied on in this case.  In 
1846, Michigan became the first State to abolish the death penalty for all 
crimes except treason, and Rhode Island soon thereafter became the first 
jurisdiction to abolish capital punishment completely.  In succeeding dec-
ades, other American States continued the trend towards abolition, espe-
cially during the years just before and during World War I.  Later, and par-
ticularly after World War II, there ensued a steady and dramatic decline in 
executions—both in absolute terms and in relation to the number of homi-
cides occurring in the country.  In the 1950’s and 1960’s, more States abol-
ished or radically restricted capital punishment, and executions ceased com-
pletely for several years beginning in 1968. 
In 1972, when this Court heard arguments on the constitutionality of the 
death penalty, such statistics might have suggested that the practice had be-
come a relic, implicitly rejected by a new societal consensus.  Indeed, counsel 
urged the Court to conclude that “the number of cases in which the death 
	
 122 DALE JAMIESON, MORALITY’S PROGRESS: ESSAYS ON HUMANS, OTHER ANIMALS, AND THE 
REST OF NATURE 19 (2002).  
 123 See, e.g., Krista L. Patterson, Acculturation and the Development of Death Penalty Doctrine in the United States, 
55 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1224–30 (2006) (describing the United States following a European trend to-
ward the abolition of the death penalty). 
 124 STEPHEN P. HINSHAW, THE MARK OF SHAME: STIGMA OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND AN AGENDA 
FOR CHANGE 54 (2007). 
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penalty is imposed, as compared with the number of cases in which it is stat-
utorily available, reflects a general revulsion toward the penalty that would 
lead to its repeal if only it were more generally and widely enforced.”  We 
now know that any inference of a societal consensus rejecting the death pen-
alty would have been mistaken.  But had this Court then declared the exist-
ence of such a consensus, and outlawed capital punishment, legislatures 
would very likely not have been able to revive it.  The mistaken premise of 
the decision would have been frozen into constitutional law, making it diffi-
cult to refute and even more difficult to reject.125 
Justice O’Connor’s examples are extremely important, but interestingly not 
the earliest illustration of the ebb and flow of the American experience with 
regard to the death penalty.  America’s colonial history reveals that opposi-
tion to the death penalty and strict limits thereupon in the seventeenth cen-
tury, including extremely progressive policies in Pennsylvania and Rhode Is-
land, were supplanted by a dramatic expansion of the death penalty during 
the eighteenth century.126  Examples of this ebb and flow can be traced much 
deeper into pages of history and far beyond the borders of the United States.  
For example, in recent years, there have been increasing calls for embracing 
the death penalty in non-capital punishment countries in response to rising 
crime rates in Latin America, even for non-homicide offenses, with public 
opinion strongly supporting application of the death penalty for kidnapping 
in Mexico, for child rape in the Dominican Republic, and for the rape of 
children and adults in Peru, among others.127 
The language of the Eighth Amendment jurisprudential framework—
evolving standards of decency, maturing society, and more humane justice—
“evoke a teleological conception of history in which human society grows more 
enlightened with the march of time.”128  The view is essentially that “humanity 
is making steady, if uneven and ambivalent, progress toward greater freedom, 
equality, prosperity, rationality, or peace.”129  That history does not move in 
such a march is certainly not a bad side to have in a debate130 with the atrocities 
	
 125 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 854–55 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omit-
ted). 
 126 See Davison M. Douglas, God and the Executioner: The Influence of Western Religion on the Death Penalty, 9 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 137, 155 n.94 (2000) (noting that while in Pennsylvania “confined the 
death penalty to murder and treason” and Rhode Island constrained application of the death pen-
alty to “relatively few crimes” the “number of capital crimes in the American colonies sharply in-
creased during the eighteenth century”). 
 127 See ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 
374 (4th ed. 2008) (contrasting societal endorsement of the death penalty with these countries’ out-
lawing of the death penalty). 
 128 Gabriel S. Sanchez, Comment, Towards a Post-Historicist Punishments Clause Jurisprudence, 56 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1321, 1330 (2007). 
 129 WENDY BROWN, POLITICS OUT OF HISTORY 6 (2001). 
 130 See, e.g., DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL 
THOUGHT 122–23 (1970) (highlighting the fallacy of false interpolation as resting on the false prem-
ise that events flow in a consistent manner over time); CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, THE END OF THE 
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of the Twentieth-Century serving as Exhibit A and the environmental degra-
dation and tribalism of the Twentieth-First Century as Exhibit B.   
Even if one accepts a generally progressive movement of history and that 
this movement manifests itself in the arena of criminal law in the United 
States, critical misplaced assumptions, nevertheless, undercut the conclusion 
that the moral evolution of criminal sanction is linear and that evolution is 
necessarily towards greater leniency.  One significant error is the assumption 
that “the basic questions can be settled once and for all, so that the answers to 
these questions can be taught to children, so that subsequent generations 
simply can build up the solutions found out by earlier generations, without 
bothering any longer about the basic questions.”131  This reflects overconfi-
dence in the moral superiority of the present that finds nothing to learn from 
a past that has been transcended and a future that has already been reached.  
Application of severe sanctions, such as the death penalty for an adult or life 
imprisonment for a juvenile offender, pose basic questions of criminal justice 
that do not lend themselves to such definitive transgenerational resolution.  
They are questions that will be, and should be, re-asked by subsequent gen-
erations rather than definitively resolved.  The nature of a living constitution 
which undergirds the evolving standards of decency framework should antic-
ipate exactly that.  Failure to acknowledge this is to undercut the entire tenor 
of the evolving standards doctrine by assuming the type of static society that 
is inherently at odds with the evolving standards of decency doctrine itself. 
Moral evolution is simply more complex than the linear sense of historical 
development allows.  As an illustration, in his seminal text The Death Penalty: 
An American History, venerable Professor Stuart Banner makes a politically con-
troversial assertion regarding Colonial Americans from whom we have 
evolved on the issue of capital punishment and their contemporary reviewers: 
The standard approach to the history of the death penalty in the United States 
has been a smug condescension to the past, a refusal even to try to understand.  
The times were rude and life was cheap, we tell ourselves.  The people of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not think as independently as we do; 
they were still shackled by oppressive political and religious traditions they 
were not yet able to throw off.  But this story is a caricature of early modern 
thought, invented (as we will see) by capital punishment’s later opponents.  Ex-
ecuting a fellow human being was just as momentous in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries as it is today.  Colonial Americans were not blindly fol-
lowing tradition.  They pondered the death penalty and the purposes it served, 
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just as Americans do today.  But because of the institutional structure and pre-
vailing religious beliefs of their time, capital punishment could serve a broader 
set of purposes than its serves today.132 
Darwinian theory does not posit that evolution brings improvement or even 
that greater complexity results; rather, it is predicated on adaptability and 
ability to survive and reproduce within the environment.133  Banner’s obser-
vation is more in accord with a Darwinian evolution than a progressivist his-
torical interpretation of the death penalty.  An observation from Justice 
Scalia fits neatly within this context and identifies a problem that a progres-
sivist interpretation of history can cause when interpreting the cruel and un-
usual punishment guarantee, and which stands at the epicenter of this Arti-
cle: “[T]he Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet, whereby a temporary 
consensus on leniency for a particular crime fixes a permanent constitutional 
maximum, disabling the States from giving effect to altered beliefs and re-
sponding to changed social conditions.”134  Changes in both beliefs and social 
conditions drive evolving views of criminal sanction, and American society 
has not arrived at a point of end of change for either. 
Additionally, the direction of moral evolution under the progressivist as-
sumption is assumed to be only one way towards greater leniency.  Thus, 
when the Supreme Court “sees a minority of legislatures supporting tougher 
death penalty rules, those legislators are stragglers who have not yet ‘seen the 
light.’”135  However, as Professor Tonja Jacobi cautions, 
those stragglers may just as easily be innovators, who are ahead of the curve 
rather than behind it.  The Court’s depiction of minority state legislatures as 
stragglers stems from its apparent assumption that there is only one direction 
in which a civilized society will “evolve,” that of gradually reducing the ap-
plication of the death penalty.136   
This creates a major complication for the evolving standards of decency ju-
risprudence in trying to hold the ratchet so that it only moves one way.  For 
as Professor Jacobi well states, in terms of applying the evolving standards of 
decency justification, “[i]t would be unprincipled for the Court to selectively 
look only to movements in popular opinion against the death penalty”137 or 
	
 132 STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 5–6 (2002). 
 133 See Bailey Kuklin, Evolution, Politics and Law, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1129, 1226 (2004) (explaining that 
Darwinism does not “impl[y] necessary superior fitness value in complex life forms” nor that evo-
lutionary change constitutes an improvement outside of “being better able to survive and repro-
duce”); Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 391 & n.7 (2004) 
(describing the erroneous assumption many theorists had about Darwinism, incorrectly believing 
“evolution was a drive toward ever-better organisms”). 
 134 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 
501 U.S. 957, 990 (1991)). 
 135 Jacobi, supra note 13, at 1122. 
 136 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 137 Id. 
Feb. 2018] SOLVING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT RATCHET PUZZLE 701 
for that matter any other sanction prohibited by the Court pursuant to its 
application of the doctrine.   
Removing the issue from the more emotionally laden and deeply intran-
sigent intellectual judgments held by so many with regard to the questions 
surrounding the death penalty allows for more readily seeing that movement 
towards more severe sanction is not and should not invariably be regarded 
as morally regressive.  Quite to the contrary, the transition toward more se-
vere sanction can be a moral evolution.  In other words, more severe sanction 
can be supported as a moral evolution in decency rather than a regression as 
illustrated by the examples of moral advance through increased sanctions 
with regard to domestic violence, white-collar crime, and environmental 
crimes, among others.   
While each has its own moral evolutionary account, the first example, 
domestic violence, serves to illustrate the broader point.  Traditionally under 
the common law, wives were the property of their husbands and subject to 
“chastisement.”138  Husbands were able to employ violence as a means of 
family control, and governmental intervention was thought to be an inap-
propriate interference of the state into the family sphere.139  Some states be-
gan to criminalize “wife-beating,” but the laws were rarely enforced and 
sanctions were imposed only in the most extreme cases.140  Political reform 
has converted domestic violence into an issue of concern and attention for 
prosecutors and resulted in the imposition of criminal sanction.141  Even 
more recently, there has been a movement from leniency toward imposition 
of more substantial punishment for perpetrators of acts of domestic vio-
lence.142  While there are a wide variety of theories on the best way to address 
the serious domestic violence problem in the United States, many would rea-
sonably see the criminalization of, then actual prosecution of, and then the 
imposition of more substantial sentences for transgressors as a moral evolu-
tion in addressing domestic violence.  This view could reasonably be held 
even though this moral evolution is not towards leniency but instead toward 
more substantial punishment for offenders. 
	
 138 Betsy Tsai, Note, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Inno-
vation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1288 (2000). 
 139 See id. at 1288–89 (explaining under Old English common law a husband was allowed to beat his 
wife with a stick no bigger than his thumb without interference from the court because state en-
gagement in addressing such behavior was deemed improper inference in the family sphere). 
 140 Id. at 1289. 
 141 See id. at 1290–91 (describing the change in how society viewed domestic violence, from a family 
matter that was not “suitable for prosecution” to a crime that required specialized prosecution units, 
intervention programs, and reform to protective orders). 
 142 Id. at 1291 (detailing the domestic violence legislation passed in many states in the 1990s that had 
“more stringent policies on arrest, prosecution, and incarceration of perpetrators”).  
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Nor has society arrived at an end to its moral evolution such that no new 
additional more stringent sanctions will be unwarranted.  Scholarly and polit-
ical discourse continue to advance many and varied arguments for imposition 
of increased punishment as part of a moral evolution on addressing societal 
problems.  As examples, commentators have called for increasing sanctions for 
the solicitation of minors, 143  for environmental crimes, 144  and for animal 
abuse,145 among other offenses.  Such increases in sanction may well reflect a 
moral evolution despite running contrary to the assumption that evolution is a 
linear progressive movement that is necessarily toward greater leniency. 
In returning to the stygian swamps of capital litigation, the Supreme 
Court’s Kennedy v. Louisiana146 decision provides a useful example of a decision 
that may not in future years continue to reflect society’s evolving moral judg-
ment.  With the justices splitting five to four, the Court ruled that the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits applying the death 
penalty to child rapists.147  The Court reached this conclusion pursuant to its 
evolving standards of decency jurisprudence with the majority finding that 
there exists “a national consensus against capital punishment for the crime 
of child rape.”148   
The reasoning employed by the majority has left many unpersuaded, in-
cluding some scholars who are largely sympathetic with Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence imposing greater limitations on states under the Eighth 
Amendment.  Reflecting upon the majority opinion, Professor Heidi Hurd 
stated, “I must be frank in saying that I find the Court’s justification for its 
judgment to be disappointing.”149  Professor Laurence Tribe, who noted that 
he had long expressed misgivings regarding “both [the] wisdom and [the] 
constitutionality” of the death penalty, struck a more strident tone in his crit-
icism.150  Professor Tribe explained his objections as follows: 
Many who applauded the court’s . . . ruling did so not on the basis of the 
court’s . . . trend-spotting rationale but, rather, on the premise that any way 
of containing the spread of capital punishment—such as by confining its use 
	
 143 See Emma Lord, Note, Stop Punishing the Victim: Why California Should Reform Its Current Prostitution Laws 
and Adopt the Swedish Approach to Combat Sex-Trafficking, 44 SW. L. REV. 599, 614 (2015) (arguing that 
“California should increase prison sentences for solicitation of a minor”). 
 144 See Susan F. Mandiberg, Locating the Environmental Harm in Environmental Crimes, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1177, 
1179 (2009) (advocating for the addition of criminal statutes to combat environmental crimes). 
 145 Kirsten E. Brimer, Comment, Justice for Dusty: Implementing Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Animal 
Abusers, 113 PA. ST. L. REV. 649, 651 (2008) (supporting mandatory minimums for animal abuse). 
 146 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 147 Id. at 413. 
 148 Id. at 434. 
 149 Heidi M. Hurd, Death to Rapists: A Comment on Kennedy v. Louisiana, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 351, 
351 (2008). 
 150 Laurence H. Tribe, Opinion, The Supreme Court Is Wrong On the Death Penalty, WALL ST. J. (July 31, 
2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121746018426398797.   
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to murderers and traitors—is a good idea.  But even those who harbor seri-
ous doubts about capital punishment should feel duty-bound to oppose 
carve-outs from its reach that denigrate certain classes of victims, or that 
arbitrarily override democratic determinations that such victims deserve 
maximum protection. 
If a legislature were to exempt the killers of gay men or lesbians from 
capital punishment, even dedicated death penalty opponents should cry foul 
in the Constitution’s name.  So too, should they cry foul when the judiciary 
holds the torturers or violent rapists of young children to be constitutionally 
exempt from the death penalty imposed by a legislature judicially permitted 
to apply that penalty to cop killers and murderers for hire.  In doing so, the 
court is imposing a dubious limit on the ability of a representative govern-
ment to enforce its own, entirely plausible, sense of which crimes deserve the 
most severe punishment. 
To be sure, holding the line at murder and treason gives the judiciary a 
bright line that blurs once one says a legislature may include other offenses 
in its catalogue of what it deems the most heinous of all crimes.  But the same 
may be said of virtually any bright line.  Placing ease of judicial administra-
tion above respect for democracy and for principles of equal justice under 
law is inexcusable. 
The Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause should 
not be construed in a manner that puts it on a collision course with the 14th 
Amendment’s equal protection clause.  The Supreme Court would do well 
to take that overriding consideration into account as it decides whether to 
revisit its seriously misinformed as well as morally misguided ruling.151 
Taking a similar view of the majority opinion, Professor J. Richard Brough-
ton made the bold assertion that the majority’s reasoning “undermine[s] 
both the Court’s legitimacy and the functioning of the political processes in 
a constitutional democracy.”152  Professor Doug Berman also added his voice 
to those “troubled by the result in Kennedy”153 and declared that he “con-
sider[ed] the Kennedy decision to be misguided as a matter of constitutional 
law and policy.”154 
Writing in dissent, and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia 
and Thomas, Justice Alito’s dissection of the majority opinion was quite ef-
fective.  Professor Orin Kerr described it as “pretty devastating,”155 and Pro-
fessor Broughton similarly found the dissent “persuasive on many fronts.”156  
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2008/09/what-will-or-sh.html. 
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Professor Broughton found that Justice Alito’s dissent “offers a compelling 
response to the majority’s national consensus analysis and demonstrates why 
capital child rape legislation can just as adequately narrow the class of death-
eligible offenders as statutory sentencing procedures for capital murder.”157 
With the opinion released during the lead-up to the 2008 Presidential 
nominating conventions, the Court’s decision was greeted with similar reac-
tions from both of the soon to be official nominees of the Democratic and 
Republican parties.158  Then Senator Barack Obama stated, “I think that the 
rape of a small child, 6 or 8 years old, is a heinous crime, and if a state makes 
a decision under narrow, limited, well-defined circumstances, that the death 
penalty is at least potentially applicable, that does not violate our Constitu-
tion.”159   The future President expressed disagreement with the Court’s 
“blanket prohibition” on executing child rapists.160   
Also responding in opposition to the Supreme Court’s decision, Senator 
John McCain indicated that he found “[t]hat there is a judge anywhere in 
America who does not believe that the rape of a child represents the most 
heinous of crimes, which is deserving of the most serious of punishments” to 
be “profoundly disturbing.”161  Senator McCain characterized the Court’s 
decision as “an assault on law enforcement’s efforts to punish these heinous 
felons for the most despicable crime.”162  The prompt public responses of the 
nominees of both major political parties were “presumably not [issued] out 
of a desire to contravene society’s ‘standards of decency’ in the middle of a 
presidential race.”163   
Public opinion polling with regard to the death penalty and child rape sug-
gests that there is strong support for the death penalty as an appropriate sanc-
tion.164  It is far from unthinkable that future legislatures could conclude that 
the death penalty should be available as a potential sanction for offenders who 
commit the crime of rape of child under the age of 12, the Louisiana provision 
that the Supreme Court found contrary to society’s contemporary moral values. 
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In considering whether change could be consistent with evolving stand-
ards of decency, it is important to consider the component of the Court’s anal-
ysis exercising its own judgment that looks at offense and offender in light of 
the retribution and deterrence criminal justice objectives.  In determining 
whether a punishment is disproportionate, the Court has observed that “a 
punishment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if it . . . makes no measurable 
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more 
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.”165  As for 
retribution and consideration of excess, the Court has observed that sanction 
should be commensurate with the societal sense of the nature of the offense: 
Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong 
doing: and, in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential that the pun-
ishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt 
by the great majority of citizens for them.  It is a mistake to consider the 
objects of punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and 
nothing else . . . . The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society 
insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong-doer deserves it, irre-
spective of whether it is a deterrent or not.166 
Retired Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found a 
strident voice to describe the role of retribution in capital punishment: 
Whatever qualms I had about the efficacy of morality of the death penalty 
were drowned out by the pitiful cries of the victims screaming from between 
the lines of dry legal prose . . . . 
. . . . 
 Brutal facts have immense power; they etched deep marks in my psyche.  
Those who commit such atrocities, I concluded, forfeit their own right to 
live.  We tarnish the memory of the dead and heap needless misery on their 
surviving families by letting the perpetrators live.167 
Standing at the “heart of the retribution rationale” under the Court’s 
analysis is the offender’s culpability.168  “[ J ]ustice generally requires consid-
eration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed 
and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together 
with the character and propensities of the offender.”169  The Supreme Court 
	
 165 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 166 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 n.30 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (quot-
ing ROYAL COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, Dec. 1, 1949, at 207 
(1950)). 
 167 Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT?  THE EXPERTS FROM BOTH SIDES MAKE THEIR CASE 1, 2–4 (Hugo Be-
dau & Paul Cassell eds., 2004). 
 168 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987); see Russell Dean Covey, Exorcizing Wechsler’s Ghost: The 
Influence of the Model Penal Code on Death Penalty Sentencing Jurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
189, 227–28 (2004) (explaining retributive punishment is backwards looking because it determines 
punishment based on the actions of the individual offender). 
 169 Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937). 
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has rejected an approach to the death penalty that “accords no significance 
to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or 
the circumstances of the particular offense [which thereby] excludes from 
consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of 
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of 
humankind.”170  Failure to do so would wrongly “treat[] all persons con-
victed of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but 
as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind 
infliction of the penalty of death.”171  Simply stated, a “criminal sentence 
must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal of-
fender.”172  Accordingly, the appropriate retributive punishment will meas-
ure the offense and the offender’s culpability and punish in accordance there-
with.173  The offender is thus punished under retributive theory because he 
or she “deserve[s] it.”174   
It is the personal culpability aspect that moved the Court’s retribution 
analysis, barring the death penalty in Ford v. Wainwright,175  Atkins,176  and 
Roper.177  In those decisions, the Court concluded respectively that people 
who are mentally ill, intellectually disabled, and juveniles are categorically 
not as culpable as non-mentally ill or non-intellectually disabled adults.  
While concerns about culpability may certainly be applicable in individual 
cases of child rape, the mental incapacities in terms of the ability to think and 
reason that were critical to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Ford, Atkins, and 
Roper are simply not present with regard to child rapists as a class.  There is 
nothing about being a child rapist that would of necessity make people less 
responsible for their actions.  Accordingly, with the retributive purpose not 
being undermined in terms of capacity, child rapists will have to find their 
reprieve in the severity of the crime because as a group they cannot find it in 
a lack of mental or intellectual capacity. 
	
 170 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 171 Id. 
 172 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987). 
 173 See Covey, supra note 168, at 227 (explaining that a retributivist approach to punishment seeks to 
render punishments proportional to the injury caused and the offender’s culpability). 
 174 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 304 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting “retribution in 
this context means that criminals are put to death because they deserve it”). 
 175 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405–10 (1986) (holding “[t]he Eighth Amendment prohibits 
the State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane”). 
 176 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–21 (2002) (explaining that if a death penalty sentence is 
not appropriate for an average murderer, then “the lesser culpability of the [intellectually disabled] 
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution”). 
 177 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–75 (2005) (determining that juvenile offenders cannot be 
subject to the death penalty because “neither retribution nor deterrence provides adequate justifi-
cation for imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders”). 
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In terms of the nature of the offense, the Court engages for its retribution 
analysis with an examination of whether the punishment “is grossly out of 
proportion to the severity of the crime.”178  In other words, in considering 
the child rape example, the question is whether the application death penalty 
is grossly disproportionate to the crime of child rape.  Throughout most of 
history of western civilization, rape has been a crime punished by death; this 
practice continued in the United States well into the mid-twentieth century 
before application of the death penalty for the crime of raping an adult was 
prohibited by the Supreme Court in Coker.179  In the immediate wake of Coker, 
it was noted that “it is conceivable that the rape of children may be distin-
guished from that of adults on the ground that it is typically more harmful to 
the victim and involves a higher degree of moral depravity.”180  There exists 
in support of this contention a viscerally powerful argument that this distinc-
tion is strongly grounded:  
The broken and bruised body of a small child after a rape, the emotional 
devastation the child will endure after the incident, the psychological terror 
the child may experience—all of these traits leave a lasting impression on 
society, and it is this pain that society may focus on when calculating the 
moral culpability of a rapist of children.181 
In his concurrence in Coker, Justice Powell suggested that the death penalty 
might still be proportionate for the crime of aggravated rape with accompa-
nying “excessive brutality or severe injury” or “an outrageous rape resulting 
in serious, lasting harm to the victim.”182  With apologies for engaging in this 
disturbing discussion, it becomes necessary to turn then to the severity of the 
crime of child rape.  It is important to note that the degree of force involved 
in an act of penetration of a child “will likely cause severe damage to the more 
delicate and underdeveloped body of a child.”183  Child sexual abuse can 
cause damage to internal organs.184  Physical problems resulting from the rape 
of a child include “abdominal pain, vomiting, urinary tract infections, peri-
neal bruises and tears, pharyngeal infections, and venereal disease.”185  Ap-
proximately thirty percent of girls that are raped suffer infections that are so 
	
 178 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 179 See J. Richard Broughton, “On Horror’s Head Horrors Accumulate”: A Reflective Comment on Capital Child 
Rape Legislation, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2000). 
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78 COLUM. L. REV. 1714, 1727–28 (1978). 
 181 Jennifer L. Cordle, Note, State v. Wilson: Social Discontent, Retribution, and the Constitutionality of Capital 
Punishment for Raping a Child, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 135, 153 (1998). 
 182 Coker, 433 U.S. at 603–04 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 183 Broughton, supra note 179, at 28. 
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severe, they are forced to undergo hysterectomies,186 and child rape may in-
crease chances of the early onset of cervical cancer.187  As adults, child sex 
abuse victims are two and half times more likely to have pelvic pain and pelvic 
inflammatory disorder and breast diseases “ranging from fibrocystic changes 
to cancer.”188  As an individual illustration of the physical harm caused by 
child rape, the eight year old girl raped by Patrick Kennedy, the defendant in 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, suffered from profuse vaginal bleeding: “Her entire peri-
neum was torn and her rectum protruded into her vagina.”189  Even after be-
ing treated by a pediatric surgeon, she had to be “fed gallons of stool softener 
through a tube to permit her to begin defecating again.”190   
The psychological trauma inflicted upon the victims of child rape is also 
severe.  “A significant body of research has demonstrated that child physical 
and sexual abuse are significant risk factors for many mental health disorders 
and problems, and that substantial proportions of children who are victims 
of physical or sexual abuse develop serious emotional and behavioral diffi-
culties.”191  Forty percent of victims between the ages of seven to thirteen 
years of age are considered to be seriously disturbed according to standard-
ized measures of psychopathology.192  Long-term psychological and behav-
ioral effects of child sexual abuse may include low self-esteem, depression, 
anxiety, fear, hostility, chronic tension, eating disorders, sexual dysfunction, 
self-destructive or suicidal behavior, post-traumatic stress disorder, dissocia-
tion, repeated victimization, running away, criminal behavior, academic 
problems, substance abuse, and prostitution.193  As an illustration of these 
effects, child sexual abuse victims are thirty times more likely to be arrested 
at some point in their lives for prostitution.194  Additional impacts include 
“insomnia, sleep disturbances, nightmares, compulsive masturbation, loss of 
	
 186 Id. at 88 n.53 (citing CHRISTOPHER BAGLEY & KATHLEEN KING, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: THE 
SEARCH FOR HEALING 119 (1990)). 
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ASSAULT 52 (2007), www.icasa.org/docs/emotional_&_physical_effects_-_draft-4.doc. 
 189 State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757, 761 (La. 2007). 
 190 Id. at 761 n.4. 
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FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1995, at 69, 70. 
 193 See KURT CONKLIN, ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE I: AN OVERVIEW OF 
STATISTICS, ADVERSE EFFECTS, AND PREVENTION STRATEGIES 2–3 (2012), http://www.advo-
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ing many of these harmful effects of child sexual abuse). 
 194 Lurigio, supra note 192, at 70. 
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toilet training, sudden school failure, and unprovoked crying.”195  Many of 
the studies addressing the effects of child sexual abuse define such abuse more 
broadly than the criminal statutes, but as significant as those impacts are, 
“[t]he effects of child sexual abuse are even more profound . . . when the vic-
timization involves force and genital contact.”196  The severe psychological 
injury extends throughout the victim’s adult life.197  Frequently “[c]hild vic-
tims never learn healthy ways to express their sexuality; as adult survivors, 
they may turn to dangerous sexual behaviors, experience sexual dysfunc-
tions, or avoid sex altogether.”198 
Perhaps the greatest perceived harm of this crime is not the physical or 
mental pain, but something that is difficult to categorize and impossible to 
quantify, a spiritual toll in the form of a loss of childhood innocence.  In 
calculating the severity of this offense, this harm should not be ignored.  This 
crime casts a pall over our society.  With the crime of child rape having 
emerged from dark societal corners, parents have become extremely con-
cerned, indeed fearful, of their children becoming victims.199  The social ef-
fects of this appear in parents limiting their children’s freedom in everything 
from playing outside to surfing the internet.  A corrosive impact on commu-
nities and an undermining of children’s independence flow from this height-
ened state of fear.  Simply stated, this offense “undermines the community[’s] 
sense of security.”200  Nor are parents’ concerns wholly irrational.  According 
to the Department of Justice, one in seven victims of sexual assault in the 
United States is under the age of six, and approximately 12% of all forcible 
rapes and nearly 54% of all acts of forcible sodomy are committed against 
children under the age of eleven.201   
Not surprisingly, special protection of age-based vulnerable classes is al-
ready common in death penalty legislation with the  homicide victim being 
elderly or a child often serving as an aggravating factor making the crime 
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 198 Lurigio, supra note 192, at 70–71. 
 199 See, e.g., Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 211 (2001) 
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death penalty eligible.202  This result follows from a desire to afford greater 
protection to these vulnerable classes and the conclusion that a perpetrator’s 
“willingness to exploit vulnerability often reveals an especially heinous disre-
gard for the humanity of others.”203  Distinguishing Coker, which barred ap-
plication of the death penalty for rape of an adult, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court noted that “[w]hile the rape of an adult female is in itself reprehensi-
ble, the legislature has concluded that rape becomes much more detestable 
when the victim is a child.”204  It has been argued that “[t]he immaturity and 
vulnerability of a child, both physically and psychologically, adds a devastat-
ing dimension to rape.”205  The physical, psychological, and spiritual harms 
to the child victim and the harm to the community render child rape an ex-
traordinarily severe crime. 
As for the question of deterrence, while this rationale has fallen into disfa-
vor among many among the members of the Supreme Court,206 with the ret-
ribution justification in a period of ascendency, deterrence has certainly not 
been wholly ignored.207  While the conflicting evidence on whether the death 
penalty, as employed, actually has any deterrent effect has troubled members 
of the Supreme Court,208  the Court’s ultimate decision on whether deter-
rence exists has turned on the intellectual and psychological capacity of the 
	
 202 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(15) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (designating as a 
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category of offender under consideration in comparison with typical criminal 
offenders rather than on empirical studies of the death penalty and crime.209  
Because the Court’s assessment of deterrence turns upon this fulcrum, the de-
terrence analysis and the above discussed retribution culpability analysis be-
come functional equivalents.210  As previously noted, though there certainly 
may be individual offenders like the mentally ill, intellectually disabled, or ju-
veniles, who are categorically impaired in their capacity to understand the 
severity of their offense, there is no such generally applicable limitation on the 
capacity of child rapists as a class.  Accordingly, just as there is no lessened 
culpability, there is no reason that the penalty cannot, under the Court’s de-
terrence capacity analysis framework, function to deter child rapists. 
The point of the above discussion regarding the crime of child rape is not 
to argue that the Court was wrong in concluding that the State of Louisiana 
transgressed contemporary moral standards by providing that child rapists were 
potentially subject to the death penalty.  The Court may well have been right.  
Instead the discussion helps to demonstrate that, even assuming the Supreme 
Court was correct in its assessment, it is far from clear that contemporary soci-
etal moral values will hold in stasis in opposition to the death penalty for child 
rapists.  To the contrary, state legislatures in the future could reasonably reach 
a contrary conclusion as a part of an evolving moral standard in considering 
how offenders who commit the crime of child rape should be punished. 
IV.  CONTINGENT LEGISLATION AS A TOOL  
EMPOWERING STATE LEGISLATURES 
But were changed beliefs and conditions to lead to such a legislative judg-
ment, state legislators would run squarely into the one-way ratchet problem.  
To reiterate Professor Eric Posner’s apt description of the practical problems 
with reversing the one-way ratchet: 
If people in the various states change their minds and come to believe that 
the punishment is justified, legislatures will not be able to enact the punish-
ment without violating the Constitution.  It seems likely that they will there-
fore not bother, and so a new consensus in the other direction cannot get 
started.  Perhaps, in the rare instances when a national consensus will de-
velop quickly, dozens of states will enact the law even though it violates the 
Constitution, and courts will recognize a change in the consensus.  But this 
	
 209 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72 (comparing the culpability of juveniles to that of adults); Ring, 
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is likely to be rare, and it loads the dice against national consensuses devel-
oping in favor of harsher punishments.211   
Under the pressure of the one-way ratchet, legislative hesitancy to pass legis-
lation that runs afoul of existent evolving standards jurisprudence may not 
be driven by a continuing substantive concurrence with the standard of con-
temporary morality as assessed by the Supreme Court in a prior decision.  
Such legislative acquiescence may instead result from a sense that contrary 
legislation would be found unconstitutional.   
In light of the ability of evolving standards to swing both towards greater 
leniency and more substantial sanction, this one-way ratchet creates policy 
distortion.  Professor Mark Tushnet has suggested that “policy distortion oc-
curs when the legislature acts within the range of policies it believes is avail-
able to it, mistakenly believing that the policy they prefer is outside that avail-
able range.”212  Where “legislators mistakenly believe that the permissible 
range is smaller than it actually is, they may choose a policy that is less desir-
able, from their own point of view, than one that the courts would allow them 
to adopt.”213  This misunderstanding may arise  
because not all legislators are well-advised about the norms the courts have 
articulated . . . [and] groups have an interest in characterizing judicially ar-
ticulated norms in the way most favorable to their positions.  On nearly every 
issue, some group will have an interest in arguing that a particular policy 
proposal lies outside the permissible range.214   
As a result, “[l]egislators concerned about not enacting unconstitutional laws 
or worried about the cost of defending a fairly litigable policy that the courts 
might reject may give these arguments more weight than they deserve.”215  
Furthermore, a legislature that experiences “uncertainty as to the constitution-
ality of its enactments may delay or weaken them so as to avoid the political 
embarrassment or financial cost of a determination of unconstitutionality.”216 
In seeking to reverse what seems to be a one-way ratchet and avoid policy 
distortion, it is important to acknowledge that no state in isolation will be 
able to demonstrate a trend establishing an evolving standard of decency 
against a sanction previously prohibited by the Supreme Court.  States must 
move together rather than alone.  The most important tool for empowering 
states to move together, and thereby to enable states to reverse the seeming 
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irreversibly one-way ratchet, is a tool that states are already using in other 
ways and for other purposes: contingent legislation.   
Legislation is contingent where a legislature passes a statute but provides 
that “it takes effect only upon the happening of a given fact or identifiable fu-
ture contingency.”217  In other words, where “a law takes effect only on the 
happening of some future event that is not certain to occur (or is not certain to 
occur at a specific time), it is contingent legislation.”218  Until the condition 
occurs, the legislation rests in a dormant slumber.219  Typically statutory pro-
visions take effect upon some future specified calendar date.220  As observed by 
Professor Gary Lawson, there is, however, “no evident reason why that effec-
tive date cannot be determined by some event other than celestial motions.”221   
Where contingent legislation is used, determination of whether the future 
contingency has occurred is generally a task assigned to an agency, often the 
agency charged with responsibility for administering the statutory meas-
ure.222  However, the determination of whether the contingency has arisen 
can also be assigned to other members of the executive or judicial branches 
of government.223  The conditioning of a statutory provision going into effect 
upon the occurrence of a future event, with the determination of whether the 
contingency has been satisfied being made by an executive or judicial branch 
official, has not been regarded as an improper delegation of legislative 
power.224  To the contrary, the determination of whether the contingency 
has arisen is thought to be consistent with the exercise of core executive and 
judicial functions.225   
In approving of the use of contingent legislation, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court observed that 
[w]here an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of 
itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some cer-
tain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended; 
and the fact of such act or event, in either case, may be made to depend 
upon the ascertainment of it by some other department, body, or officer, 
which is essentially an administrative act.226 
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In other words, so long as it is not the content of the legislation that is con-
tingent but instead the question of if and when the statute will go into effect 
that is contingent, the contingent measure will be considered, though 
dormant, to constitute validly passed legislation.227  The Washington Su-
preme Court’s analysis is reflective of other state judiciaries in addressing 
separation of powers challenges to contingent legislation: 
[C]onditioning the operative effect of a statute upon a future event specified 
by the Legislature does not transfer the state legislative power to render judg-
ment to the persons or entity capable of bringing about that event.  The 
Legislature, itself, determines the statute would be expedient only in certain 
circumstances.  The power to make this judgment is not transferred merely 
because the circumstances may arise at the discretion of others.  The sub-
stance of the act is complete in itself and the Legislature is the body which 
rendered the judgment as to the expediency of conditioning the operation of 
the statute upon the specified event.228 
Contingencies upon which a statute’s effectiveness have turned include 
adoption of an amendment to a state constitution,229 the availability of fed-
eral funding,230 compliance by private entities with certain safety regula-
tions,231 creation of a municipal planning commission,232 and enacting of cer-
tain types of taxing measures by county commissioners,233 among a wide 
variety of other conditions.  In some respects, constitutional amendatory con-
ditions stand as particularly interesting corollaries for the evolving standards 
related legislation insofar as 
[i]t is the general rule in this country that a legislature has power to enact a 
statute not authorized by the existing constitution of that State when the stat-
ute is passed in anticipation of an amendment to its constitution authorizing 
it or which provides that it shall take effect upon the adoption of an amend-
ment to its constitution specifically authorizing and validating such statute.234 
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 229 See, e.g., Smigiel v. Franchot, 978 A.2d 687, 692–99 (Md. 2009) (describing an amended provision 
of the Maryland Constitution); In re Thaxton, 437 P.2d 129, 131 (N.M. 1968) (discussing the repeal 
of a provision in the New Mexico Constitution); Henson v. Ga. Indus. Realty Co., 142 S.E.2d 219, 
223–24 (Ga. 1965) (describing a provision passed into Georgia Law). 
 230 See Opinion of the Justices, 44 So. 2d 1196, 1196–97 (Ala. 1977) (finding constitutional legislation 
contingent upon federal appropriations). 
 231 See Sofia Ranchordás, Innovation Experimentalism in the Age of the Sharing Economy, 19 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 871, 876 (2015) (discussing sunrise clauses which requires parts of statutes or regulation 
which to come into effect upon compliance with safety regulations). 
 232 See City of Chicago v. Central Nat’l Bank, 125 N.E.2d 94, 96–98 (Ill. 1955) (examining a legislative 
provision that allowed municipalities to construct certain facilities with the approval of a plan com-
mission). 
 233 See Okey v. Walton, 302 N.E.2d 895, 900–02 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973) (hearing a state constitutional 
challenge to a law that allowed counties to levy a property transfer tax with approval of the board 
of county commissioners). 
 234 Henson, 142 S.E.2d at 223–24.  
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State courts have consistently concluded “that a statute which is expressly 
made contingent upon the adoption of a constitutional amendment is valid 
even where, as here, the Legislature would have had no power to so act in 
absence of the amendment.”235  Such enactments are similar to the circum-
stance confronted when legislating under the pall of a contrary prior ruling 
from the Supreme Court interpreting the evolving standards of decency in a 
manner that stands in opposition to the legislature’s preferred policy approach. 
Another recurring basis of contingency, and one that provides a model 
for states for reversing the one-way ratchet, is conditioning legislation going 
into effect upon adoption of corresponding legislation by other states either 
through reciprocal arrangements or with effectiveness contingent upon 
adoption by a specified number of states.236  Approving of the propriety of 
utilizing a contingency that turns upon the actions of another state govern-
ment, the Kansas Supreme Court observed: 
In all these cases it is the law of the home government which is enforced, 
and the action of the foreign government only makes the contingency upon 
which the law becomes operative.  There is no difference in principle be-
tween such contingency and any other which may be provided for in the 
statute.  In all such cases it is the duty of the officer charged with the execu-
tion of the law to inquire as to the facts, and ascertain whether the contin-
gency named has arrived, and if so to enforce the mandate . . . .237 
Contingency being tied to the actions of other states can be seen in wide 
variety of legislative schemes with examples including everything from state 
regulation related to pest control,238 the dairy industry,239 and the operation 
of libraries240 to the creation of the Multistate Tax Commission, which only 
became effective upon adoption by seven states.241  Perhaps the most prom-
inent example in recent years of adoption by other states as a condition upon 
which legislation going into effect turns is the National Popular Vote Inter-
state Compact.  This legislative initiative makes use of the authority granted 
to state legislatures under Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States 
Constitution to “appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may di-
rect” the state’s electors to the Electoral College.  The states that adopt the 
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact agree to appoint electors not 
based upon which candidate garners the most votes in their state but instead 
	
 235 Busch v. Turner, 161 P.2d 456, 459 (Cal. 1945). 
 236 See Robert W. Bennett, State Coordination in Popular Election of the President Without a Constitutional Amend-
ment, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 141, 147 (2002) (noting that “ample precedent for state legislation where 
effectiveness is contingent on action by other states”). 
 237 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Welch, 29 Kan. 672, 678 (Kan. 1883). 
 238 GA. CODE ANN. § 2-7-130 (2016) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (providing that measure does 
not go into effect until enacted by five states). 
 239 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 258-kk (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2018, chapter 1). 
 240 OR. REV. STAT. § 357.340 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 241 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 454 (1978). 
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to the winner of the national popular vote.242  The legislation does not, how-
ever, become effective upon adoption but instead only upon reaching a crit-
ical point at which the states adopting the measure control the appointment 
of the majority of electors to the Electoral College.243  Or in the words of 
Article IV, Clause 1 of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, “This 
agreement shall take effect when states cumulatively possessing a majority of 
the electoral votes have enacted this agreement in substantially the same 
form and the enactments by such states have taken effect in each state.”244  
As explained by Dean Vikram Amar: 
[Because of] states not wanting to deemphasize local preferences in favor of 
a nationally popular candidate unless other states are willing to do so also, 
the NVP Plan by its own terms would not become effective until and unless 
a combination of states representing a majority of the Electoral College de-
nominator—that is, states whose Electoral College allotments when com-
bined equal 270 or more—sign on.245 
Contingent legislation is even more important in empowering states to 
demonstrate evolution in the direction of imposing a sanction previously 
barred under the evolving standards of decency.  An individual state could, 
acting independently, allocate the state’s electoral votes to the winner of the 
national popular vote.  An individual state in isolation could not, however, 
demonstrate a change in societal moral standards with regard to imposition 
of a previously prohibited sanction.   
To help delineate the mechanics of how contingent legislation would op-
erate in the evolving standards context, it is helpful to work through an exam-
ple.  Assume state legislators in State X want to reinstate as a potential sen-
tence life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender over the age 
of sixteen who commits the crime of rape involving both kidnapping and tor-
ture if it is determined by the appropriate sentencing authority (judge or jury) 
to be the proper sanction after an individualized sentencing hearing.  Cur-
rently, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. 
Florida, such a sanction is unconstitutional when imposed upon a juvenile of-
fender because the crime is not a homicide offense.246  Despite this constitu-
tional bar, it is not difficult to conceive that a state legislature could in future 
years conclude such a sanction is appropriate and, in fact, view the more se-
vere sanction as a moral evolution either based on a retribution or deterrence 
analysis.  If rendered immediately effective, the measure would certainly be 
	
 242 See Bennett, supra note 236, at 144–47 (arguing that a state compact to allocate electoral votes ac-
cording to the national popular vote would survive a compact clause challenge). 
 243 Vikram David Amar, Constitutional Change and Direct Democracy: Modern Challenges and Exciting Opportu-
nities, 69 ARK. L. REV. 253, 264 (2016). 
 244 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6921 (West 2017). 
 245 Amar, supra note 243, at 264. 
 246 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010). 
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struck down as being unconstitutional.  After all, this sanction is not available 
to state legislatures pursuant to Graham v. Florida.247  Thus, the legislature of 
the enacting state would need to provide that its measure does not become 
effective until a specified number of states enact measures that are substan-
tially similar to the provision enacted by State X.  In terms of determining 
whether the contingency has been satisfied, while it is unnecessary to assign 
responsibility to the same executive branch figure in each state, it would be 
prudent to do so.  The legislature thus could charge the state’s Attorney Gen-
eral with responsibility for monitoring legislation in other states to determine 
if the specified number of states had enacted substantially similar legislation. 
Three additional components would be helpful in ensuring that the states 
were moving forward together rather than alone or with insufficient com-
pany.  While none of these are absolutely essential, they are all likely to be of 
assistance given the significant challenge of seeking to reverse the seemingly 
irreversible one-way ratchet.  One, as an extra precaution a component, 
could be added to the contingency limitation providing that the measure does 
not become effective until the substantial similarity is verified by the requisite 
number of Attorneys General assessing the language of their own respective 
state provisions.  Two, given the importance of notice, the legislation should 
require that the Attorney General shall provide notice to the legislature, the 
governor, state prosecutors, and the public that the measure has become ef-
fective.  Three, with regard to such legislation, the measure could become 
effective on the same date after the occurrence of the contingency (for exam-
ple: the first July 1st following notification).   
One of the challenges in designing the mechanics of such legislation is 
identifying the appropriate number of states necessary to reverse the ratchet.  
Based upon existing Supreme Court precedent, sixteen states seems an ap-
propriate, though admittedly somewhat arbitrary, choice.  As discussed be-
low, the Supreme Court has already found sixteen states adopting legislation 
to constitute strong objective evidence of an evolution in society’s standard 
of decency sufficient to constitute a basis for reversing prior precedent—
though one moving toward leniency.  Based upon the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Roper v. Simmons,248 an argument can be made in support of the view 
that a smaller number could reverse the ratchet so long as the movement is 
exclusively in one direction.  In Roper v. Simmons,249 the Court reversed its 
earlier decision in Stanford v. Kentucky250 finding a change in societal evolving 
	
 247 Id. 
 248 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 249 Id. 
 250 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
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standards of decency over the course of sixteen years with only four addi-
tional states abandoning the death penalty251 for juveniles but where all the 
movement was in one direction towards abandonment of the death penalty 
for juveniles.252  Or as stated by the Roper Court, 
The number of States that have abandoned capital punishment for juvenile 
offenders since Stanford is smaller than the number of States that abandoned 
capital punishment for the [intellectually disabled] after Penry; yet we think 
the same consistency of direction of change has been demonstrated.  Since 
Stanford, no State that previously prohibited capital punishment for juveniles 
has reinstated it.253 
Another reason that this small number was sufficient in Roper, which will not 
be present in seeking to reverse the ratchet, is the Roper Court was impressed 
that this shift was into headwinds of “special force in light of the general pop-
ularity of anticrime legislation and in light of the particular trend in recent 
years toward cracking down on juvenile crime in other respects.”254 
Thus, to find more solid ground for reversal of direction, it is helpful to 
look at a case wherein the Supreme Court viewed the objective evidence of 
change in society’s standard of decency as overwhelming.  The Supreme 
Court found sixteen states adopting legislation to prohibit application of the 
death penalty as to a certain class of offenders (intellectually disabled persons) 
constituted strong objective evidence of a changed societal evolving standard 
of decency sufficient to reverse its previous evolving standards ruling of Penry 
v. Lynaugh255 thirteen years later in Atkins v. Virginia.256 
States working collaboratively so as to strengthen their voice in the con-
stitutional dialogue with the Supreme Court over defining societal evolving 
standards of decency is greatly aided by the existence of active cooperative 
state governmental organizations and victims’ advocacy groups that are na-
tional in scope.  Organizations like the National Association of Attorneys 
General,257 the National Conference of State Legislatures,258 the National 
Governors Association,259 and the National District Attorneys Association260 
	
 251 See Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 33 (2007) (explaining that only four legis-
latures had abolished the juvenile death penalty in the six years preceding Roper’s 2005 decision). 
 252 Roper, 543 U.S. at 566. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. (citation omitted). 
 255 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 256 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–15, 321 (2002); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Individual 
Right to Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 888, 892–93 (2006) (arguing that The 
Court’s shift in opinion was the result of the changing “national mores” reflected in state legislatures).  
 257 NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., http://www.naag.org/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2018). 
 258 NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2018). 
 259 NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/cms/home.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) 
 260 NAT’L DISTRICT ATT’YS ASS’N, http://www.ndaa.org/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2018). 
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all provide powerful networking opportunities for states to disseminate infor-
mation and communicate in seeking to advance their favored criminal justice 
approaches against the strong undertow of contrary Supreme Court evolving 
standards of decency precedent.  Another important practical aspect for ad-
vancing such legislation emerges from victims’ rights advocacy groups having 
found in recent years a stronger voice in state government.261  A multitude of 
victims’ rights organizations function on a national stage and are well posi-
tioned to help advance contingent legislation imposing more substantial 
sanction.  These include, for example, the National Alliance of Victims’ 
Rights Attorneys & Advocates, 262  the National Center for Victims of 
Crime,263 and the National Organization for Victim Assistance264 as well as 
groups that organize around advocating for victims of particular crimes.265  
The existing structure of active inter-governmental collaboration that exists 
among state governments and the emergence of national in scope victims’ 
advocacy organizations provide realistic forums for working collaboratively 
and political muscle for advancing contingent legislation on multiple fronts.   
V.  CONDITIONAL LEGISLATION DOES NOT  
VIOLATE THE COMPACT CLAUSE 
While a literal interpretation of the Compact Clause of the United States 
Constitution could potentially pose a barrier to the conditional legislative so-
lution advanced in this Article, the approach advanced herein does not vio-
late the Compact Clause.  The Compact Clause provides, in part, that “[n]o 
State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement 
or Compact with another State.”266  A literal reading of the Compact Clause 
would, as observed by the Supreme Court, “require the States to obtain con-
gressional approval before entering into any agreement among themselves, 
irrespective of form, subject, duration, or interest to the United States.”267  
Recognizing the problems with such an understanding and not persuaded 
that was the purpose of this constitutional provision, “the Supreme Court has 
definitively rejected a literalist interpretation of” the Compact Clause.268 
	
 261 See Susan A. Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 
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In seeking to understand the intended purpose and scope of the Compact 
Clause, the Federalist Papers offer a less than edifying explanation of this 
constitutional measure.  Madison observed in Federalist 44 that the “partic-
ulars of this clause fall within reasonings which are either so obvious, or have 
been so fully developed, that they may be passed over without remark.”269  
Though evidently “the contours of the terms were clear to the Framers, they 
soon ceased to be so to subsequent interpreters.”270 
The Supreme Court settled in the 1890s upon a functionalist interpreta-
tion of the Compact Clause and has not since waivered from this understand-
ing of the provision.  Writing for the Court in 1893 in Virginia v. Tennessee, 
Justice Stephen Field observed regarding the Compact Clause that “it is evi-
dent that the prohibition is directed to the formation of any combination 
tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach 
upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”271  This un-
derstanding in many respects harkens to a prohibition contained in the Arti-
cles of Confederation that “[n]o two or more States shall enter into any 
treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the con-
sent of the United States, in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the 
purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall con-
tinue.”272  Under the Supreme Court’s interpretive approach, in contradis-
tinction to a literal interpretation, not all interstate compacts and agreements 
in absence of congressional authorization violate the Compact Clause.   
For Justice Field and the post-1893 Supreme Court, “[s]tate agree-
ments . . . should be subject to the constitutional requirement of congres-
sional consent only if they threaten to encroach upon the full and free exer-
cise of federal authority.”273  With this understanding in place, “the twentieth 
century witnessed a marked expansion in the number, subject, and form of 
such agreements.”274  Professor Duncan Hollis has observed that in a post-
New Deal America, “interstate compacts become mechanisms for states to 
share information and to jointly study, and even regulate, various collective 
action or coordination problems.”275 
The challengers in the 1978 case of United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax 
Commission asked the Supreme Court to restrain this growing use of such 
measures and to reject Justice Field’s narrow understanding of limitations 
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imposed by the Compact Clause.276  The challengers’ specific target was the 
Multistate Tax Commission.277  The Multistate Tax Commission had come 
into existence following the adoption of the Multistate Tax Compact by 
seven states and played a significant role in the administration of state taxa-
tion in those states that adopted the Multistate Tax Compact.278  The Mul-
tistate Tax Commission had become a powerful mechanism for states ac-
complishing what they could not independently achieve in addressing issues 
of taxation with large multi-state companies.279  The Supreme Court unam-
biguously refused the challengers’ invitation to circumscribe the use of state 
compacts and instead deeply entrenched Justice Field’s interpretation of 
	
 276 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 459–60 (1978). 
 277 Id. at 454–59. 
 278 The Supreme Court explained the Multistate Tax Commission in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax 
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Compact Clause into the Court’s jurisprudence, constructing a more formal-
ized legal test to be applied to give effect thereto.280  The Court declared that 
the test is whether the Compact enhances state power quoad the National 
Government.  This pact does not purport to authorize the member States to 
exercise any powers they could not exercise in its absence.  Nor is there any 
delegation of sovereign power to the Commission, each State retains com-
plete freedom to adopt or reject the rules and regulations of the Commission.  
Moreover . . . each State is free to withdraw . . . .281 
In other words, in determining whether interstate compacts or agreements 
among states violate the Compact Clause, the Court reasoned that interstate 
compacts, even those that  
increase the bargaining power of member states vis-à-vis the federal govern-
ment would not impinge on federal authority unless the compact (a) author-
ized member states to do things they could not do in the compact’s absence; 
(b) delegated sovereign powers to an institution established by the Compact; 
or (c) restricted the ability of states to exit the compact.282 
None of the aforementioned is applicable to the proposed contingent leg-
islative approach advanced in this Article.  States can and do pass criminal 
law statutes and delineate the sanctions available for violations thereof.  
States are not exercising any sovereignty belonging to the federal govern-
ment through imposing criminal sanctions.  Additionally, the Court’s evolv-
ing standards of decency jurisprudence is designed to measure the views of 
the states collectively.  The Supreme Court’s evolving standards of decency 
jurisprudential framework is designed to recognize and honor the trends ex-
isting in states, not to set the Court’s own standard in contravention of the 
states’ moral judgment.  The doctrine is consistent with recognition of the 
states’ role in the system of federalism, not exclusion thereof.  Furthermore, 
the states are not delegating any sovereign powers to an institution created 
by the Compact.  In fact, they are not creating any external institution.  States 
are also free to abandon the legislation at any point.  Thus, the contingent 
legislative approach recommended herein simply does not qualify as an un-
constitutional compact or agreement among the states. 
Additionally, the contingent legislation approach advanced herein does 
not appear, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Northeast Bancorp, 
Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,283 to even qualify as a com-
pact for purposes of the Compact Clause.  The Northeast Bancorp, Inc. Court 
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identified four “classic indicia of a compact” under the Compact Clause in-
cluding “(i) setting up a regulatory organization or body; (ii) conditioning ac-
tion on corresponding actions of other participants; (iii) restricting a partici-
pant’s ability to modify or repeal its own laws; and (iv) reciprocal constraints 
on each State’s regulations.”284  In Northeast Bancorp, Inc., Massachusetts pro-
vided that holding companies whose principal place of business was outside 
Massachusetts could acquire a Massachusetts bank so long as the state 
wherein the out-of-state holding company principally did business would al-
low a Massachusetts holding company to do the same in its state.285  Reci-
procity for Massachusetts holding companies by another state legislature be-
ing necessary to trigger extension of the favorable Massachusetts measure to 
out-of-state holding companies was not thought to be sufficient to satisfy the 
second indicator, the only possible compact category into which the legisla-
tive approach proposed herein could fall, under the Northeast Bancorp, Inc. de-
cision.  As observed by Professor Duncan Hollis: “Without legally binding 
conditions or deep organizational structures . . . these criteria suggest no 
compact exists.”286  Because states are free to withdraw and no deep organi-
zational structures are being created by the contingent legislative proposal 
set forth herein, it appears that the proposed measure may not even qualify 
as a compact, much less an unconstitutional compact. 
Writing in 1965, Professor David E. Engdahl observed that “[i]n every case 
since Virginia v. Tennessee in which an interstate arrangement has been chal-
lenged for lack of congressional consent, it has been held exempt from the con-
sent requirement.”287  The weight of this point has only increased in accord-
ance with Professor Michael Greve’s observation, writing four decades after 
Professor Engdahl, that “it appears that no court has ever voided a state agree-
ment for failure to obtain congressional consent.”288  The conditional legisla-
tive proposal advanced in this Article does not violate the Compact Clause.   
VI.  RESOLUTIONS AS A SUPPLEMENTAL TOOL  
EMPOWERING STATE LEGISLATURES 
While not as powerful of a tool for engaging with the Supreme Court in 
seeking to reverse the seemingly irreversible one-way ratchet as contingent 
legislation, legislative resolutions can also play an important supplemental 
role in helping to inform the Supreme Court’s understanding of society’s 
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contemporary moral values.  The Supreme Court interprets states’ failure to 
provide for a sanction as reflecting a moral judgment against the imposition 
thereof.289  That is often a questionable interpretation, and sometimes simply 
false.  States often reject sanctions not because of a moral judgment against 
the measure but instead for other reasons.  As observed by Professors Carol 
S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, “[t]he high cost of administering the death 
penalty has become a prominent—perhaps the most prominent—issue in 
contemporary discussions about whether the penalty should be limited or 
abolished.”290  States are also inhibited from imposing sanctions because of 
policy distortion related to uncertainty about Supreme Court precedent and 
the Court’s future rulings applying the evolving standards analysis.  In other 
words, a state legislature’s failure to provide for a more adverse sanction may 
not reflect a moral view that the punishment is unwarranted.291  Instead, the 
failure to provide for such a sanction may reflect a legislature’s sense that the 
punishment is too costly or a concern that the sanction would be found to be 
unconstitutional by the courts.   
Instead of the Supreme Court simply interpreting the absence of imposi-
tion of sanction in state legislation as a moral judgement against that sanction, 
states are well equipped as cases move through the judicial system arriving at 
the United States Supreme Court to provide a clear indication of their views 
on the evolving standards of decency questions being considered by the high 
court.  A state legislature can utilize resolutions to dialogue with the Supreme 
Court.  Instead of the Court presuming the state’s reasons, they can make 
those reasons express.  Thus, for example, states can express that, while they 
do not provide for a particular sanction for the type of offense or offender, 
their state’s failure to do so does not reflect a moral judgment that such sanc-
tion is cruel or unusual.  While unlikely to be afforded the same weight as 
legislation that has taken effect, the use of resolutions can be helpful in provid-
ing greater clarity regarding the moral judgements which are or which are not 
actually being reached by the states on matters of criminal justice. 
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CONCLUSION 
The conventional wisdom is understandably that the Supreme Court’s 
evolving standards of decency jurisprudence has created a one-way ratchet.  
This one-way ratchet only tightens and restricts the discretion afforded to 
state legislatures always and only moving towards greater leniency and away 
from stricter sanction.  But state legislatures are not as powerless as they may 
seem.  In isolation, states cannot hope to turn the ratchet.  Individually they 
lack the strength to show an evolution in society’s moral standards, but work-
ing collaboratively they can exert much greater force in a dialogue with the 
Supreme Court over contemporary societal moral standards.  The tools of 
collaborative state action in this context are not incredibly complex, contin-
gent legislation and the active use of resolutions.  The existent cooperative 
governmental associations provide critical networking forums to make use of 
these tools more than a theoretical possibility.  The increased influence of 
national victims’ rights organizations helps to provide the political muscle.   
The Supreme Court’s evolving standards of decency jurisprudence is an 
expressly living constitution honoring framework of constitutional analysis.  
“A ‘living constitution’ is one that evolves, changes over time, and adapts to 
new circumstances, without being formally amended.”292   The Supreme 
Court has created a jurisprudential framework that links a living Eighth 
Amendment prohibition upon cruel and unusual punishment to contempo-
rary moral standards.  These standards do not, however, move exclusively in 
a linear manner or only towards greater leniency.  Moral evolution can be 
towards increased sanction.  If the Constitution is a living document and its 
Eighth Amendment framework draws its vitality from contemporary stand-
ards, then the Court must be prepared, if states use the right tools, to allow 
the ratchet to turn both ways. 
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